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Under Crawford v. Washington and Davis v. Washington, the Supreme
Court has created a new interpretation of the right of confrontation that
holds out-of-court testimonial statements inadmissible without cross-
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examination. In order to determine if statements for purposes of medical
diagnosis and treatment should continue to be an exception to confrontation, this Article reviews the historical evidence cited by the Court. The
Court's originalist analysis holds that the only exception for what the
Court refers to as "testimonial statements" is the exception for dying
declarations. This Article establishes that a significant number of
confrontation exceptions existed for testimonial statements in 1791,
which indicates that Crawford's central holding-that the Founders
intended the Confrontation Clause to be an absolute bar to the
admission of out-of-court testimonial statements-is inaccurate. The
historical evidence also indicates that statements for purposes of medical
treatment and diagnosis were a confrontation exception in 1791 and
should continue to be an exception today. This Article also asserts that
the definition of testimonial statements should be limited to formal
statements taken by law enforcement officers or their agents and
outlines how agency law should be used as part of the Court's new
interpretation of confrontation.

I.

INTRODUCTION

Imagine you are the parent of a three-year-old girl who has been
sexually assaulted and you have taken her to a physician for medical
care. You want justice for your daughter, but the court rules that she
is not competent to understand the oath; thus the court will not allow
her to testify at trial.1 Or, imagine that the court has found your
daughter competent to testify, but a psychologist has told you that your
daughter will suffer serious and perhaps long-lasting psychological
trauma if she is forced to face her rapist in the courtroom. You tell the
prosecutor that you and your daughter still want the case prosecuted in
order to protect other children from being sexually assaulted. Can the
prosecutor proceed to trial by having the doctor testify about what your
daughter told the physician? Given the Supreme Court's interpretation
of the right of confrontation, can the prosecutor proceed to trial even if
your daughter is unavailable to testify and be cross-examined?
Since the United States Supreme Court decision in Crawford v.
Washington,2 prosecutors have been scrambling to introduce out-of-court
statements of witnesses without violating Crawford's new interpretation

1. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 601 and 603; 18 U.S.C. § 3509(c) (2000) (explaining child
competency examinations).
2. 541 U.S. 36 (2004).

20071

CRAWFORD V. WASHINGTON

of confrontation.'

Crawford holds that when an out-of-court statement

of an unavailable witness is testimonial, the Sixth Amendment requires
that the accused be given a prior opportunity to cross-examine the
witness.4 Among the confrontation exceptions widely used before the
Crawforddecision-which the Court had found to be "firmly rooted" and,
thus, did not violate confrontation-were statements for purposes of
medical diagnosis and statements to a treating physician.'
The
continued use of the medical exception to confrontation is particularly
important in child abuse cases because some young children will be
unavailable, either because they are found to be incompetent6 or
because they find it very difficult, and sometimes traumatizing, to testify
in court.7

II.

CRAWFORD V. WASHINGTON'S ORIGINALISM

A. Justice Scalia Declares That Crawford is Based on the Original
Intent of the Founders
Justice Scalia bases Crawford's holding on what he states is the
original intent of the Founders in establishing the Confrontation
Clause.8 The Court in Crawford concludes that the Founders would not
have allowed testimonial statements to be admissible in court because
the admission of testimonial statements would have violated a defendant's right of confrontation and cross-examination.'
Based on

3. See id. at 51-53, 69.
4. Id. at 53-54.
5. See White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 356, 356 n.8 (1992). Hereinafter only the words
"medical exception" will be used in lieu of the longer title: "statements for purposes of
medical diagnosis and statements to a treating physician." Arguably, one can do an
analysis for statements for medical diagnosis or statements to a treating physician and
treat them as two separate exceptions. See generally Robert P. Mosteller, Child Sexual
Abuse and Statements for the Purpose of Medical Diagnosis or Treatment, 67 N.C. L. REV.
257 (1989).
6. See American Prosecutors Research Institute (APRI), INVESTIGATION AND
PROSECUTION OF CHILD ABUSE 327-28 (3d ed. 2004).
7. See 1 JOHN E.B. MYERS, MYERS ON EVIDENCE IN CHILD, DOMESTIC AND ELDER
ABUSE CASES §§ 3.01, 3.05[C] (2005).
8. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 54 (stating that the right of confrontation in the Sixth
Amendment admits "only those exceptions established at the time of the founding."). "We
must therefore turn to the historical background of the Clause to understand its meaning."
Id. at 43. "The founding generation's immediate source of the [confrontation] concept,
however, was the common law." Id.
9. Id. at 53-54 ("[Ihe Framers would not have allowed admission of testimonial
statements . . . ."). "It is questionable whether testimonial statements would ever have
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Crawford's originalist reasoning, if certain testimonial statements were
exceptions to confrontation at the time of the Founders, these testimonial statements should be admissible today.1 ° Although the Court
declined to give a comprehensive definition to the term "testimonial," the
Court did state that "it applies at a minimum to prior testimony at a
preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former trial; and to
police interrogations."11 The Court also indicated that plea allocutions
are testimonial. 2 The Court's use of the term "testimonial" appears to
be directed at statements taken by law enforcement when the circumstances objectively indicate to a reasonable person that the statements
could be used in a later criminal prosecution."8
In Crawford Justice Scalia stated that the only testimonial statement
admissible in 1791 when the witness was unavailable was a dying
declaration.14 He stated that if the existence of dying declarations as a
testimonial statement must be accepted on historical grounds, it is only
because the dying declarations exception is one of a kind. 5 Given
Crawford's originalist methodology, in order to determine whether
statements under the medical exception should continue to be an
exception to confrontation or whether the statements are testimonial and
thus inadmissible without confrontation, it is necessary to examine the
historical record and determine if Crawford's historical interpretation is
correct. "6
B. Other ConfrontationExceptions Allowed for Admissibility of
Statements Taken by Justices of the Peace and at Coroner'sInquests
When Necessity Could Be Shown
As support for his position in Crawford that testimonial statements
were not admissible when the witness was unavailable at trial and there
had been no prior opportunity for cross-examination, Justice Scalia
addressed the issue of whether the Marian statutes (so called because

been admissible on that ground in 1791 ... ." Id. at 58 n.8. "Where testimonial
statements are involved, we do not think the Framers meant to leave the Sixth
Amendment's protection to the vagaries of the rules of evidence . .. ." Id. at 61.
10. See id. at 56 n.6 (observing that dying declarations existed in 1791).
11. Id. at 68.
12. Id. at 65.
13. Id. at 51-53.
14. Id. at 56 n.6.
15. Id. ("If this exception must be accepted on historical grounds, it is sui generis.").
16. See The Supreme Court,2003 Term: Leading Cases, 118 HARV. L. REV. 316, 323-24
(2004) (indicating that because Crawford is an originalist interpretation it requires "a
renewed analysis of the historical evidence" rather than a parsing of "the dicta within the
court's opinion").

2007]

CRAWFORD V. WASHINGTON

573

they were passed during the reign of Queen Mary) had created an
exception for the admissibility of pretrial depositions at trial. 17 The
Marian statutes were originally used to admit sworn depositions taken
before justices of the peace and statements made at a coroner's inquest
if necessity could be shown. Necessity existed in instances of death or
witness unavailability. 18 The Marian statutes only allowed admissibility without confrontation when the requirements of the statutes were
met. When necessity could be shown, these depositions were used at
trial, even though no confrontation and cross-examination occurred.' 9
In Crawford Justice Scalia stated that depositions were not admissible
without an opportunity for cross-examination, even if the requirements
of the Marian statutes were met.2 ° Justice Scalia's Crawford opinion

17. Id. at 43-47. A good description and explanation of the Marian statutes is given
in JOHN LANGBEIN, PROSECUTING CRIME IN THE RENAISSANCE: ENGLAND, GERMANY,
FRANCE 1-125 (1974) [hereinafter LANGBEIN, PROSECUTING CRIME].
18. See 2 WILLIAM HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 605 (Thomas
Leach ed., 6th ed. 1788).
19. See, e.g., 2 MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 52, 284285 (1736); GEOFFREY GILBERT, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 99-100 (1st ed. 1754).
20. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 46-47, 47 n.2. Justice Scalia cites an 1808 treatise for the
proposition that whether a confrontation exception existed for statements taken at a
coroner's inquest was a point that had not been "'expressly decided in any reported
case.'" Id. at 47 n.2 (quoting THOMAS PEAKE, A COMPENDIUM OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE
64, n.(m) (3d ed. 1808)). Justice Scalia then cites American cases written over half a
century after the ratification of the Confrontation Clause, and Cooley's treatise, which was
written over three quarters of a century after 1791, for the proposition that "[w]hatever the
English rule, several early American authorities flatly rejected any special status for
coroner statements." Id. (citing State v. Houser, 26 Mo. 431, 436 (1858); State v. Campbell,
30 S.C.L. (1 Rich.) 124 (1844); THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL
LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN

UNION 318 (1st ed. 1868)). Actually, the English and early American authorities show
Scalia's historical analysis is mistaken and support the admissibility of coroner statements
as a confrontation exception well after the ratification of the Confrontation Clause.
Justice Scalia cites the third edition of Peake, supra, at 65 n.(m), for the proposition that
early American law was undecided on the admissibility of coroner statements. See
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 47 n.2. But Justice Scalia fails to note what the rest of the footnote
in Peake's treatise stated: "[N]evertheless the practice has been to admit them after the
death of the witness, without inquiring whether the party was present or not; and
notwithstanding the objection of counsel, they were received by Mr. B. Hotham, in the King
and Puresoy [King and Puresoy] Maidstone Sum. Aff. 1794." PEAKE, supra, at 65 n.(m).
Justice Scalia also fails to refer to the text that cites footnote (m). After referring to the
Marian statutes, Peake goes on to state in the main text: "In like manner depositions taken
before a coroner, have, in cases of death, or absence beyond sea, of the witness, and where
there is reason to believe the prisoner has sent them away, been used on a trial for
murder." Id. at 47.
An earlier edition of Peake's treatise, an American edition published in 1802, does not
contain the statement about the point not having been "expressly decided in any reported

574

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58

holds that by the time of the ratification of the Sixth Amendment, the
opportunity for cross-examination was required in all cases, even if the
Marian statutes stated several exceptions. 2 English case law from
that period flatly contradicts Justice Scalia's assertion.
In King v. Flemming & Windham,22 the Twelve Judges upheld the
criminal conviction of individuals who raped a girl under the age of
twelve, even though no confrontation and no cross-examination had
occurred at trial.2" No confrontation or cross-examination took place
because, at the time of trial, the girl was dead.24 Justice Scalia's
Crawford analysis would indicate that the girl's deposition was a
testimonial statement and should not-have been admissible without an
opportunity for either cross-examination at the time the deposition was
taken or cross-examination at trial. Although the accused were present
at the time the girl's deposition was taken before the justice of the peace,
the record does not show that the accused were given an opportunity for
cross-examination. 25 Nor does the deposition indicate that the girl was

case." THOMAS PEAKE, A COMPENDIUM OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 41 n.(m) (1802). The
1802 American edition also contains the same quote from the third edition that states that
depositions before the coroner may be used in certain cases when the witness is
unavailable. See id. at 41. Even though the 1802 edition's text is contrary to the position
for which Justice Scalia is arguing, one would think as an originalist he would have wanted
to cite the earlier edition, which was published on a data closer to the ratification of the
Confrontation Clause. It appears Justice Scalia does not do so because the earlier edition
contradicts his opinion that the matter was undecided in 1791. If one is doing an
originalist analysis, Cooley's treatise can hardly be reasonably considered an "early
American authority." See COOLEY, supra; see also Thomas Y. Davies, What Did the
Framers Know, and When Did They Know It? Fictional Originalism in Crawford v.
Washington, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 105, 180 n.234 (2005) ("No one could seriously propose that
sources from the latter half of the nineteenth century constitute evidence of the original
meaning of a provision of the Bill of Rights.").
21. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 46-47. John H. Langbein, one of the foremost scholars of
early Anglo-American criminal procedure, states that the ultimate rationale of the hearsay
rule, promoting cross-examination, was "not settled until well into the early nineteenth
century." JOHN H. LANGBEIN, THE ORIGINS OF ADVERSARY CRIMINAL TRIAL 233 (2003)
[hereinafter LANGBEIN, ORIGINS]. Langbein acknowledges there is an overlap between
hearsay and American confrontation doctrine, but he is "puzzled at the failure of the
English common law to identify and develop the confrontation policy as a matter of
doctrine." Id. at 233-34 n.241. Professor Randolph N. Jonakait rejects Justice Scalia's view
that the Sixth Amendment constitutionalized English common law procedures and argues
the origins of the Confrontation Clause are largely American. See Randolph N. Jonakait,
The Originsof the ConfrontationClause:AnAlternative History, 27 RUTGERS L.J. 77 (1995).
22. 2 Leach 854, 168 Eng. Rep. 526 (Cr. App. 1799).
23. Id. at 854-56, 168 Eng. Rep. at 526-27.
24. Id. at 854, 168 Eng. Rep. at 526.
25. See id. at 854-56, 168 Eng. Rep. at 526-27.
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cross-examined by the accused.26 At trial, the assize judge 27 ruled
that the Marian statutes did not require the sworn deposition to be
signed because the deposition was under oath, and it was admissible
even though the girl was unavailable to testify.2" On appeal, the
Twelve Judges upheld the assize judge's trial ruling that the Marian
statutes allowed the admissibility of the girl's sworn deposition.29
Defense counsel did not even argue that a confrontation right had been
violated because the girl had not been cross-examined. 0 Instead,
counsel argued that the girl's deposition was not evidence and that even
if the girl's deposition was evidence,31the deposition was still inadmissible
because the girl had not signed it.

Flemming and Windham's Case demonstrates that at least until 1799,
English courts considered the Marian statutes to create exceptions to
confrontation and cross-examination. The case is also important because
it shows that in cases of sexual assault on a child who was unavailable
to testify at trial, confrontation and cross-examination were not always
required. But the case also shows that Justice Scalia is mistaken in his
overall historical analysis of the right of confrontation. In Crawford
Justice Scalia states that King v. Paine,2 a 1696 case, settled the issue
of whether there was a requirement for the right of confrontation and
cross-examination under the common law.13 Justice Scalia also stated

26. See id. at 854-55, 168 Eng. Rep. at 526.
27. Assize judges originally consisted of twelve individuals who gave a verdict based
on their own investigation. Later, the use of the title "assize" was given to the court, time,
or place where judges tried cases with the assistance of a jury from a particular county.
See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 110 (5th ed. 1979).
28. Flemming and Windham, 2 Leach at 855, 168 Eng. Rep. at 526-27.
29. Id. at 856, 168 Eng. Rep. at 527.
30. See id. at 854-56, 168 Eng. Rep. at 526-27.
31. Id. at 855, 168 Eng. Rep. at 526. Interestingly, a surgeon also gave testimony in
the case. The case states, "The surgeon who examined both the girl and the prisoners,
deposed that the two prisoners were diseased with a 'lues,'" a venereal disease, as was the
girl. Id. at 854, 168 Eng. Rep. at 526. "[Firom [the evidence of a witness named Bynton],
and the evidence of the surgeon who examined the girl, and also of her father and mother,
it appeared that both the prisoners had been connected with the girl against her will, and
that they had penetrated her body...." Id. Defense counsel only objected to having the
deposition of the girl introduced as evidence. Id. at 855, 168 Eng. Rep. at 526. It appears
that defense counsel did not object to the surgeon's repeating any out-of-court statements
made by the girl to the surgeon so that the physician could form an opinion or diagnosis
shortly after the rape occurred. See id. at 854-56, 168 Eng. Rep. at 526-27. Flemming and
Windham's Case is an example of an early authority showing that in child sexual assault
cases, physicians were able to give opinions based on information obtained from their
patients.
32. 5 Mod. 163, 87 Eng. Rep. 584 (K.B. 1696).
33. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 45-46.

576

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58

that "by 1791 even the statutory-derogation view had been rejected with
respect to justice-of-the-peace examinations."34 In support of this
proposition, Justice Scalia cites King v. Woodcock 35 and King v.
Dingler.36 Because Flemming and Windham's Case was decided in
1799, Paine, Woodcock, and Dingler cannot stand as the controlling
authorities Justice Scalia believes them to be. 37 Flemming and
Windham's Case is not the only legal precedent that shows Justice Scalia
is mistaken. 8

34. Id. at 54 n.5.
35. 1 Leach 500, 168 Eng. Rep. 352 (Old Bailey 1789).
36. 2 Leach 561, 168 Eng. Rep. 383 (Old Bailey 1791); see also Crawford, 541 U.S. at
54 n.5.
37. See Davies, supra note 20, at 120-89 (indicating that after a careful and thorough
review of Paine and other cases cited in Crawford, Justice Scalia misinterpreted the
applicability of these cases to the Marian statute's confrontation exceptions). Justice Scalia
states that Woodcock and Dingler show that by 1791, "courts were applying the crossexamination rule even to examinations by justices of the peace in felony cases." Crawford,
541 U.S. at 46. Actually, both cases merely hold that in order for depositions to be
admissible when the witness is unavailable at trial, the justice of the peace had to take the
depositions in the manner those courts interpreted as being required by the Marian
statutes. See Woodcock, 1 Leach at 502, 168 Eng. Rep. at 353; Dingler,2 Leach at 562, 168
Eng. Rep. at 384. Admittedly, the decisions held the depositions should be taken by the
justice of the peace in the defendant's presence, but neither case held that the defendant
had to be given the right of cross-examination at the time of the deposition in order for the
statement to be used at trial when the witness was unavailable to testify.
Woodcock, 1 Leach at 502, 168 Eng. Rep. at 353, does not refer to cross-examination but
states that a deposition should not be admissible if the accused was not present and he
"had no opportunity of contradicting the facts" in the deposition. Of course, an accused
could contradict the accuser's statement simply by addressing the justice of the peace after
the accuser spoke. Woodcock upheld the convictions because the deposition was admissible
as a dying declaration. See Woodcock, 1 Leach at 503-04, 168 Eng. Rep. at 503-04.
Although Dingler does refer to cross-examination, Dingler, 2 Leach at 562, 168 Eng. Rep.
at 384, the judges in Flemming and Windham's Case must have considered that language
to be dicta. If the judges in Flemming and Windham's Case had interpreted Dingler's
holding to be that an opportunity for cross-examination was required they should have
reversed the convictions.
38. The Marian statutory confrontation exceptions only applied to felony cases. As the
leading scholar of the Marian statutes notes, the "scheme itself concerns exclusively felony
and manslaughter." See LANGBEIN, PROSECUTING CRIME, supra note 17, at 75. Paine only
applied to misdemeanor cases and was widely interpreted in both England and America
as only applying to these cases. See, e.g., GILBERT, supra note 19, at 100; HAWKINS, supra
note 18, at 606. William Hawkins's treatise summarizes the case law on the use of sworn
depositions and addresses the Marian statutes. Hawkins states,
[Ilt is said to have been adjudged in the seventh year of Will. 3. by the court of
king's bench upon advice with the justices of the common pleas, upon an
indictment for a libel, that depositions taken before a justice of peace relating to
the fact could not be given in evidence, though the deponent were dead; and that
the reason why such depositions may be given in evidence in felony, depends upon
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Justice Scalia states in Crawford that according to English authorities,
by 1791 a number of the confrontation exceptions that existed under the
9
Marian statutes were considered in "derogation of the common law."
By "derogation" one assumes Justice Scalia means "[tihe partial repeal
or abolishment of a law, as by a subsequent act which limits its scope or
impairs its utility and force."4 ° However, even if the Marian statutes
were in derogation of the common law, English courts could not use the
common law to repeal, abolish, or control them. As Justice Scalia has

the statutes of Philip and Mary [the Marian statutes]; and that this cannot be
extended farther than the particular case of felony.
HAWKINS, supra note 18, at 606.
For decades after the ratification of the Confrontation Clause, additional treatises widely
used in America continued to state that depositions taken pursuant to the Marian statutes
were admissible in felony but not misdemeanor cases. See, e.g., 2 JOSEPH CHTrry, A
PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE CRIMINAL LAw 585 (Garland Publ'g 1978) (1816) ("It seems
that the statutes [i.e. the Marian statutes] which authorize the justices to take them
extend only to cases of manslaughter and felony; and therefore they are not admissible in
case of a mere misdemeanor, or for publishing a libel, or in any civil action, information,
or appeal."); S.M. PHILLIPPS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 277-78 (1st American
ed. 1816) (indicating that depositions "may be given in evidence ... for the same felony"
yet "cannot be given in evidence on indictment for misdemeanor"). In the first evidence
treatise written by an American, Thomas Starkie summarizes the case law on the use of
depositions at trial: "Such depositions [the depositions taken under the Marian statutes]
are not admissible, except in case of felony; and therefore, upon an information for a libel,
a deposition taken by a magistrate in the defendant's absence cannot be read." 2 THOMAS
STARKIE, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE LAw OF EVIDENCE 491-92 (2d ed. 1828). Phillipps
cites Paine as his authority for the proposition that depositions are not admissible in
misdemeanor cases, PHILLIPPS, supra, at 277, and Starkie's quotation also cites Paine as
its authority, see STARKIE, supra, at 492 n.(u); see also Davies, supra note 20, at 174-75,
175 n.225. Starkie's and Phillipps's citations to Paine indicate Justice Scalia has misread
Paine: the Founders would not have considered Paine to be applicable to the Marian
statutorily-created confrontation exceptions.
39. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 46.
40. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 27, at 399. If derogation means a repeal or
abolishment of a law by a subsequent act, the Marian statutes were not in derogation of
the common law. The Marian statutes were not passed after the development of the
English common law doctrine of confrontation but instead were passed in the 1550s, well
before the Paine decision that Justice Scalia claims "settled" the law of cross-examination
in 1696. See LANGBEIN, PROSECUTING CRIME, supra note 17, at 26 (noting that "[t]he law
of evidence neither prohibited nor even seriously circumscribed the use of deposition
evidence. Depositions elicited through Council investigations were freely admissible-for
example, confessions of accomplices and imputations of accusing witnesses who did not
appear at trial."). Even under Justice Scalia's interpretation, English common law
development of the right of cross-examination was subsequent to the Marian statutes.
When passed by Parliament, the Marian statutes did not repeal, abolish, impair, or limit
the common law right of cross-examination because the right was not in existence in 1554
or 1555. As the common law right of confrontation and cross-examination developed, the
Marian statutes were "grandfathered in" as confrontation exceptions.
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acknowledged elsewhere, English courts did not have the ability to use
judicial review to repeal, abolish, or control the application of statutes
passed by Parliament.4
Flemming and Windham's Case, a 1799

41.

Professor Wood accepts as orthodoxy Lord Chief Justice Coke's statement in Dr.
Bonham's case (1610) that "in many cases, the common law will controul Acts of
Parliament and sometimes adjudge them to be utterly void: for when an act of
Parliament is against common right and reason, or repugnant, or impossible to be
performed, the common law will controul it and adjudge such Act to be void." It
was not orthodoxy at all, but an extravagant assertion of judicial power, scantily
supported by the authorities cited, vehemently criticized by contemporaries, and
seemingly abandoned by Coke himself in his Institutes.
ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATrER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 129-30
(1997) (footnotes omitted) (quoting Dr.Bonham's Case, 8 Co. Rep. 114a, l18a, 7 Eng. Rep.
646, 652 (K.B. 1610)). "To the contrary, it was accepted (Lord Chief Justice Coke in Dr.
Bonham's case notwithstanding) that courts were in principle bound by statutory
enactments." Id. at 131. Justice Scalia further noted:
As Professor J.H. Baker describes it, "[little more was heard in England of
judicial review of statutes, and Coke's doctrine of 1610 was whittled down into a
presumption to be applied only where a statute was ambiguous or in need of
qualification by necessary implication." . .. [Clonstruing statutory ambiguities
to be harmonious with the common law is quite different from ignoring plain texts
that contradict the 'right and reason' of the common law.
Id. at 130 (quoting J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 242, 242

(3d ed. 1990)).
Decades after ratification of the Confrontation Clause, English Courts did begin to
construe the Marian statutes strictly and hold that the accused should have an opportunity
not only to be present but an opportunity for cross-examination if the deposition was to be
admissible at trial. See, e.g., Rex v. Smith, [1817] Holt 614, 615, 171 Eng. Rep. 357, 360
(Nisi Prius 1817) (noting "[the Marian statute] did not mention the prisoner's presence at
all. Undoubtedly, however, the decisions established the point, that the prisoner ought to
be present, that he might cross-examine."). Smith, however, is ambiguous because the
accused waived any cross-examination, and his waiver was the basis for the holding. Id.
at 357. The common law courts began to reason that the opportunity for cross-examination
was a requirement for admissibility of the deposition not because the Marian statutes were
in derogation of the common law, but because the Marian statutes did not mention the
right of cross-examination.
Interestingly, although the court in Smith cites King v. Radbourne, 1 Leach 457, 168
Eng. Rep. 330 (Old Bailey 1787), as the basis for its holding that the opportunity for crossexamination is a requirement for later admissibility of the deposition at trial, that was not
the holding in Radbourne. The Radbourne Court held that depositions of the accuser taken
by the justice could be introduced if, at the time of trial, the accuser was dead. 1 Leach
at 462, 168 Eng. Rep. at 333. In Radbourne "the deposition was taken in the hearing of
the prisoner, and of course the question [whether an opportunity for cross-examination was
required] did not arise." STARKIE, supra note 38, at 488 n.(c). In fact, the court in
Radbourne held that if the deposition was taken in the accused's presence, then it was
admissible at trial; furthermore, the issue of cross-examination was not even raised by
defense counsel. See Radbourne, 1 Leach at 460-63, 168 Eng. Rep. at 332-33. It appears
the common law courts began requiring that the suspect be present at the deposition, and
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decision, shows that Justice Scalia is mistaken when he states that "by
1791 even the statutory-derogation view had been rejected with
reference to justice-of-the-peace examinations."42
Flemming and Windham's Case also demonstrates that Chief Justice
Rehnquist's concurring opinion in Crawfordis more historically accurate.
Chief Justice Rehnquist stated that the concern of the Founders in
preventing the admissibility of out-of-court statements was not so much
based on an English common law right of confrontation but on the fact
that such statements were not made under oath.4 3 At that time, the
oath was given much more importance than perhaps some would ascribe

then only later, well after 1791, did the courts begin to require that the suspect be given
an opportunity for cross-examination at the time of the deposition. In 1848 Parliament
amended the Marian statutes to explicitly state that the accused must have the
opportunity for cross-examination of the accuser at the deposition if the deposition was to
be admissible when the accuser was unavailable at trial. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 47.
42. Crawford, 461 U.S. at 54 n.5. Justice Scalia cites an 1854 case which states an
opportunity for cross-examination at the time of a deposition was required based on an
"equitable construction of the law" as part of his argument the Marian statutes were in
derogation of common law. See Crawford, 461 U.S. at 47 (citing The Queen v. Beeston, 29
L. & Eq. R. 527, 529 (Ct. Crim. App. 1854)) (Jervis, C.J.) (also reported at 405 Dears, 179
Eng. Rep. 782, 785 (Ct. Crim. App. 1854)). Beeston, however, was decided over sixty years
after the ratification of the Confrontation Clause and does not support an originalist
argument this "equitable construction" occurred by 1791. When Beeston refers to an
"equitable construction of the law" having occurred, it refers to an equitable construction
of the law having occurred by the time Parliament acted in 1848 to make crossexamination a requirement of the Marian procedures by statute. See Beeston, Dears at
407, 179 Eng. Rep. at 785. Beeston was rebutting the argument that cross-examination
was only required in 1854 because of statutes passed by Parliament in 1848. See id. An
equitable construction of the common law requirement for cross-examination did not
become established until after ratification of the Confrontation Clause.
Analysis by scholars who have reviewed the requirement of cross-examination and the
Marian statutes also supports the conclusion that an opportunity for cross-examination
only became a common law requirement for admissibility of depositions after 1791. See
DAVID J.A. CAIRNs, ADVOCACY AND THE MAKING OF THE ADVERSARIAL CRIMINAL TRIAL

1800-1865, 120 (1998) ("At the time of the Prisoners' Counsel Act [18361 it was established
at common law, although only recently, that the prisoner had a right to be present when
the depostions were taken, and to question the witnesses"); David Freestone & J.C.
Richardson, The Making of English Criminal Law: (7) Sir John Jervis and His Acts, 1980
CRIM. L. REV. 5, 11 n.30-31 (indicating that depositions had been admitted in a 1824
murder case although neither accused, who were charged jointly, had been allowed to be
present at the taking of the pretrial depositions of the other, but citing other nineteenth
century cases that held cross-examination was necessary for deposition admissibility); W.
Wesley Pue, The Criminal Twilight Zone: PretrialProcedures in the 1840s, 21 ALBERTA
L. REV. 335, 336, 361 n.180 (1983) (citing cases from the 1800s indicating crossexamination became a requirement for deposition admissibility in the nineteenth century
and the 1848 statute "simply made 'law' of existing court 'practices'" at that time).
43. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 69-72 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
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to it today." English and early American authorities also indicate
Chief Justice Rehnquist's historical analysis about the admissibility of
depositions taken by justices of the peace and coroner statements is more
accurate than the majority opinion. 4
44. See James Oldham, Truth-Telling in the Eighteenth-CenturyEnglish Courtroom,12
LAw & HIST. REV. 95, 102-07 (1994). Oldham refers to one of the leading evidence treatises
of the time, which stated that statements not under oath were not evidence and that since
hearsay statements were not made under oath, they should not be considered evidence.
Id. at 102-03; see GEOFFREY GILBERT, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 152 (3rd ed. 1769). The issue
was not one of confrontation but one of admissibility under the common law of evidence.
At one time, the oath was not only considered to ensure reliability of evidence, but was
itself the evidence. In the Middle Ages, defendants proved their innocence by gathering
together people who would swear under oath that they believed the defendant had not
committed the crime. See SADAKAT KADRI, THE TRIAL 19-20 (2005). These gatherings,
known as compurgation, often would involve the participants swearing upon saint's relics.
Defendants who swore under oath they had not committed the offense were absolved of
guilt because it was believed God was observing the event, and no one would lie knowing
the result of lying would be to spend eternity in hell. Id.
45. See infra notes 55-75 and accompanying text; HAwKINS, supra note 18, at 605.
Starkie addressed the issue of the use of statements taken before justices of the peace and
at coroner inquests in his American treatise. See STARKIE, supra note 38, at 484-92.
Starkie, writing as late as 1828, interprets several cases as requiring that a deposition
taken before a justice of the peace be taken in the accused's presence for it to be admissible
at trial if the witness was unavailable. Id. However, it is not altogether clear that in 1791
the Founders would have considered that the physical presence of the defendant was
required in all cases involving statements to justices of the peace if the depositions were
to be admissible when the witness was unavailable at trial. Professor Davies has carefully
reviewed all published statements regarding Marian depositions that were available in
1787, the year of the framing of the Confrontation Clause, and none of these make any
reference to the requirement that the arrestee be present when the witness's deposition is
taken by a justice of the peace. See Davies, supra note 20, at 170-71. "The silence in the
treatises as to the presence of the arrestee is significant because it strongly suggests that
the arrestee played no role in Marian deposition practice." Id. at 171. Even if physical
presence was a requirement, Starkie does not state that the cases held that the opportunity
of cross-examination, in addition to the defendant's physical presence at the deposition, was
also a requirement for admissibility ofjustice of the peace statements. See STARKIE, supra
note 38, at 485-92.
Thomas Peake's first edition of his evidence treatise has no mention of cross-examination
at the time of the appearance before the justice of the peace as being a requirement for
later admissibility if the witness is unavailable at trial. See THOMAS PEAKE, A
COMPENDIUM ON THE LAw OF EVIDENCE 38-41 (Garland Publ'g 1979) (1st ed.1801). Other
widely relied-on evidence treatises also show that an opportunity for cross-examination at
the time a deposition was taken was not a requirement for later admissibility. See
GILBERT, supra note 19, at 100; HAWKINS, supra note 18, at 605-06.
If the opportunity for cross-examination when the justice of the peace took the deposition
was a requirement for admissibility of an unavailable witness's deposition at trial, one
would think that these evidence treatises would have stated such. Starkie's review of the
case law as late as 1828, along with these treatises, provides compelling evidence that in
1791 the opportunity for cross-examination at the time the justice of the peace or coroner
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Legal sources indicate that during the 1600s, the physical presence of
the witness in front of the defendant, even at a trial, was only required
at the time the witness took the oath.46 At Sir Walter Raleigh's trial,
legal procedure did not give defendants the right of cross-examination;
Raleigh did not even ask to be allowed to cross-examine his accuser,
Cobham.47 Raleigh only requested that Cobham be produced before
him in court. 4 It is unlikely that the opportunity for cross-examination
was the reason a deposition by the justice of the peace was supposed to
be taken in the defendant's presence:
[Cloncern about the want of cross-examination remained a muted
theme in criminal practice throughout the eighteenth century. The
first judicial mention of that rationale for excluding what we would call
hearsay that has come to my attention in the Session Papers turns up
in 1789, in
the decade when the use of defense counsel was becoming
49
frequent.

It is unlikely that concern about cross-examination at the time the
deposition was taken existed in England during the 1700s because
defense attorneys were rarely present, even at felony trials.5 ° If
defense attorneys were rare at felony trials, they also probably were not
present at the taking of the depositions pursuant to Marian procedures.

took the statement was not a requirement for admissibility at trial when the witness was
unavailable.
If the opportunity for cross-examination by the defense existed as a right at Marian
hearings in 1791, then the accused should have had a right to counsel at the Marian
hearings in order for counsel to conduct cross-examination of any witnesses. Presence of
defense counsel, however, was not considered a right but left totally to the discretion of the
justices of the peace well into the early nineteenth century. See Rex v. Borron, 3 B. & A.
432, 438, 106 Eng. Rep. 721, 723 (K.B. 1820) ("An attorney has no right even to be present
at such an inquiry [a Marian hearing]"); Cox v. Coleridge, 1 B. & C. 37, 43, 107 Eng. Rep.
15, 17 (K.B. 1822) ('Nor can the presence of an attorney be requisite, in order to examine
witnesses for the prisoner; for it does not appear that the prisoner has any right to
examine witnesses in this stage of the case. If the magistrate proceeds under the Statute
of Ph. & M., he must examine the witnesses on oath"); see also Pue, supra note 42, at 339,
353, 362 ("It would seem that magistrates frequently (if not usually) exercised their
discretion against an accused's right to legal assistance").
46. See Frank R. Herrmann & Brownlow M. Speer, Facingthe Accuser: Ancient and
Medieval Precursorsof the Confrontation Clause, 34 VA. J. INT'L L. 481, 529, 539-40 (1994).
47. Id. at 545.
48. Id.; see also Daniel Shaviro, The Confrontation Clause Today in Light of Its
Common Law Background, 26 VAL. U. L. REV. 337, 342 (1991).
49. LANGBEIN, ORIGINS, supra note 21, at 245 (footnotes omitted).
50. Id. at 256. Langbein notes: "Although defense counsel was allowed from the 1730s,
most of the felony caseload remained lawyer-free throughout the eighteenth century (and
long beyond). Then as now, most criminal defendants were paupers, unable to afford
lawyers." Id.
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Since the accused usually was not trained in the law, cross-examination
by the accused was unlikely to be very helpful.51 It was not until
defense lawyers became greater participants at trial that cross-examination came to be considered an important right for the defense.52
If there was a requirement for the accused to be present when the
justice of the peace took a deposition, it may have been because of
precedents in the 1600s establishing that the defendant be present when
the witness took the oath at a jury trial. The right of cross-examination
at jury trials had not been established by these precedents and was not
part of Marian procedures, which were established by statutes in 15541555. 53 Nothing in the history of the Marian procedures indicates that
an opportunity for cross-examination by the accused was considered to
be a pretrial right when a witness was deposed by a justice of the
peace.54 Cross-examination clearly was not an established right for
51.

Id. at 271.

52. See generally id. at 67-172. If any opportunity for cross-examination at the taking
of the deposition existed, it was an opportunity for cross-examination of a witness by a
justice of the peace and not an accused. Cf LANGBEIN, ORIGINS, supra note 21, at 31
(indicating that in England during the early 1700s, defense lawyers could only address
matters of law, so trial judges did intervene episodically to cross-examine witnesses). The
English rule against defense counsel did not apply to misdemeanor cases. Id. at 36. In
parts of America, the English practice was not followed, and defense attorneys could crossexamine witnesses at trial. Id. at 40 & n.146.
53. See Phil. & M., c. 13 (1554) (Eng.); 2 & 3 Phil. & M., c. 10 (1555) (Eng.).
54. Even if at the time of the Founders the accused was required to be present, there
still was not necessarily a requirement for the accused to have an opportunity for crossexamination. The most likely reason for having the accused present at the taking of the
witness's deposition was that it allowed the justice of the peace to question and challenge
the accused based on what the accuser said. The accused may have been allowed to speak
and to give a response addressed to the justice of the peace after the deponent was
examined but before the justice drafted the affidavit. Case law as late as 1814 supports
this interpretation. See Rex v. Forbes, [1814] Holt 599, 599, 171 Eng. Rep. 354, 354 (Nisi
Prius 1814) (indicating that the accused's presence was necessary at a deposition "so that
he may know the precise words [the accuser] uses, and observe throughout the manner and
demeanour with which he gives his testimony"). Forbes states nothing about the right of
the accused to have an opportunity for cross-examination as being a requirement for later
admissibility of a deposition at trial. Statements made by the accused before a justice of
the peace were not under oath. See LANGBEIN, ORIGINS, supra note 21, at 51-52. The
accused was not allowed to testify under oath at trial because defendants were considered
to have an interest in the outcome. Id.
If the accused had been allowed to cross-examine witnesses when a deposition was taken
before justices of the peace, those depositions or affidavits should reflect such crossexaminations. See LANGBEIN, PROSECUTING CRIME, supra note 17, at 91 (recognizing that
"[i]t became customary for [justices of the peace] to put an indented heading on
examinations, disclosing the date and place of the examination and the names and titles
of the examiners and examinees."). Scholars who have studied the Marian statutes have
not referred to finding any manuscripts, affidavits, or depositions indicating that the
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coroner's inquests because there was no requirement that the coroner's
inquest even be held in the defendant's presence.5"

accused was given the opportunity to cross-examine witnesses when justices of the peace
took depositions. See generally, e.g., LANGBEIN, PROSECUTING CRIME, supra note 17, at 1125. Treatises from the time of the Founders do not indicate justices of the peace were to
give the accused an opportunity for cross-examination at the time of the deposition. See
supra note 45. Nor did justice of the peace manuals indicate that an accused was to be
given the right of cross-examination. See, e.g., A NEW CONDUCTOR GENERALIS, 153
(Albany, D. & S. Whiting 1803); WILLIAM GRAYDON, THE JUSTICES AND CONSTABLES
ASSISTANT BEING A GENERAL COLLECTION OF FORMS OF PRACTICE; INTERSPERSED WITH
VARIOUS OBSERVATIONS AND DIRECTIONS-TOGETHER WITH A NUMBER OF ADJUDGED
CASES, RELATIVE To THE OFFICES OF JUSTICE OF THE PEACE AND CONSTABLE 122-23
(Harrisburg, John Wyeth 1805). The depositions and affidavits do reflect that it was the
justice of the peace who conducted the examination and examined or cross-examined any
witnesses in order for the justice to prepare the deposition or affidavit. See LANGBEIN,
PROSECUTING CRIME, supra note 17, at 1-125 (Langbein provides a verbatim copy of a 1519
deposition at 98-103).
The purpose and history of the Marian statutes also indicate that it is unlikely the
statutes were used to give the arrestee an opportunity to cross-examine witnesses. The
purpose of the Marian statutes was to establish bail procedures and a record to act as a
check on the discretion of justices of the peace so they would not abuse their authority by
inappropriately releasing arrestees when bail or detention was justified. Id. at 6-11, 111.
The appearance before the justice of the peace was a preliminary procedure only. See id.
at 65. Justices of the peace focused on incriminating evidence. Id. at 18-19. Under the
statutes, justices of the peace had limited powers to release any suspect because only
persons exercising commissions of "gaol delivery," usually assize judges, could discharge
accused felons. See id. at 7. ("The JP had only two options when someone had been
accused of an undoubted felony. He could jail the accused or bail him. He could not
discharge him."). Given the limited releasing power of justices of the peace and the
purposes of the statutes, allowing an opportunity for cross-examination by the accused
would have had limited utility.
55. See infra notes 56-59. Chitty, writing as late as 1816, states that physical presence
of the defendant was required for a deposition taken by a justice of the peace to be
admissible at trial if the witness was unavailable, but that the defendant's physical
presence was not necessary for the admissibility of statements taken at a coroner's inquest.
See CHITTY, supra note 38, at 586-87. Chitty states that the defendant's physical presence
was not required at a coroner's inquest "because the coroner is an officer appointed on
behalf of the public, and will be presumed to have acted properly in all matters within his
jurisdiction." Id. at 587. Chitty does not state that the opportunity of cross-examination
is a requirement for the admissibility of statements taken by justices of the peace or
coroners if the witness is unavailable at trial. Id.
Phillipps's treatise, also printed in 1816, citing English authorities, states that under the
Marian statutes, "it has been resolved unanimously by all the judges, that... [ifl any of
the witnesses... have been examined before the coroner,. . . their depositions may be read
on the trial of the prisoner," when the witness is dead or unavailable. PHILLIPPS, supra
note 38, at 279.
It does not appear from the report of either of the cases above cited, whether the
depositions were taken by the coroner in the presence of the prisoner. But it
seems to be the prevailing opinion, that they are admissible, though the prisoner
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The reasoning in Flemming and Windham's Case, which dealt with
statements to justices of the peace, can also be applied to statements
made at a coroner's inquest because both are confrontation exceptions
under the Marian statutes.5 6 Admissibility of statements taken at a
coroner's inquest when a witness was unavailable at a later trial is
especially relevant to the medical exception to confrontation because
coroner inquests were considered medico-legal proceedings. 7 Coroner
inquests often involved proceedings where physicians gave medical
opinions to the coroner's jury based on the physician's diagnosis of a
patient's condition or cause of death. 58 At a later trial, physicians were
allowed to give the same opinions and state their diagnosis just as they

may have been absent at the time of taking the inquisition.
Id.
Phillipps raised the cross-examination issue and stated that the lack of crossexamination did not prevent depositions taken by the coroner from being admitted at trial.
Id. Phillipps cited English authorities for the proposition that generally "depositions are
not evidence, where there cannot be a cross-examination. .. 'yet, if the witnesses examined
on a coroner's inquest be dead or beyond sea, their deposition may be read.
'" Id. at
279-80.
56. A sworn deposition was admissible at trial
if it be made out by oath to the satisfaction of the court, that such [witness] is
dead, or unable to travel, or kept away by the means or procurement of the
prisoner, and that the examination offered in evidence is the very same that was
sworn before the coroner or justice, without any alteration whatsoever.
HAWINS, supra note 18, at 605. Starkie, writing as late as 1828, notes that a deposition
taken at a coroner's inquest was admissible at trial when the witness was unavailable even
if it had been taken when the prisoner had not been present at the inquest. See STARKIE,
supra note 38, at 487-92. Starkie noted that it was believed the coroner's inquest
statements were different from those taken by a justice of the peace because statements
made at an inquest were publicly made on matters so notorious everyone was presumed
to have notice of the inquest and because the coroner was considered to be a higher officer
than the justice of the peace. See id. at 487-88. Starkie criticizes the use of statements
from a coroner's inquest, and states it should be a matter of "grave and serious
consideration" "when the question arises" whether it ought to be supported, but his treatise
acknowledges that the Marian statutes remained valid. Id. at 491-92. As of 1828, sworn
coroner statements were admissible even when the witness was unavailable at trial. Id.
Although it can be argued that if one has notice of a coroner's inquest, one has had notice
of an opportunity to cross-examine inquest witnesses, prior opportunity for confrontation

and cross-examination were not requirements for later admissibility at trial. See id. at
491.
57. See, e.g., Mark Jackson, Suspicious Infant Deaths: The Statute of 1624 and Medical
Evidence at Coroners' Inquests, in LEGAL MEDICINE IN HISTORY 64, 65 (Michael Clark &

Catherine Crawford, eds. 2004).
58. Id. at 75 (indicating that during the 1760s and 1770s, physicians were increasingly
being called as witnesses in infanticide cases to give an opinion on whether the infant was
alive when born).

CRAWFORD V. WASHINGTON

2007]

had at a60 coroner's inquest. 59

585

Hearsay was often used at a coroner's

inquest.

C. Crawford's Analysis Does Not Support Crawford's Interpretation
of ConfrontationExceptions in 1791
Chief Justice Rehnquist also was more historically accurate than the
majority opinion when he referred to many confrontation exceptions as
being in existence in 1791, while also acknowledging that the law of
confrontation and its exceptions was still evolving.6 ' Ironically, the
majority in Crawford also acknowledges that in 1791 there were at least
three confrontation exceptions for statements, even if testimonial: dying
declarations,6 2 forfeiture by wrongdoing,63 and spontaneous declarations.64

59.

Id. at 69.

60. See id. at 72. ("[Dlepositions contain details of preliminary inquiries made in the
neighbourhood before official intervention, and include accounts of the questioning of
suspects by their neighbours.")
61. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 73-74 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
62. See id. at 56 n.6. In addition to Crawford's citation of English cases, an early
American evidence treatise also refers to dying declarations. See PHILLIPPS, supra note 38,
at 200-01. Justice Scalia declined to explicitly hold that dying declarations should be
considered a confrontation exception even though he acknowledged that the exception
clearly existed in 1791, even for testimonial statements. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 56 n.6.
An earlier Supreme Court decision has already done so. In Mattox v. United States, 156
U.S. 237 (1895), the Court held that both dying declarations and the admission of prior
testimony were proper exceptions because they were Confrontation Clause exceptions at
the time the Sixth Amendment was enacted and were justified by necessity. Id. at 243-44.
If one includes the Court's acknowledgement in Mattox that prior testimony is an
exception, then along with the three exceptions acknowledged in Crawford, the Court has
acknowledged at least four exceptions to confrontation that include statements that can be
considered testimonial and that existed in 1791. Interestingly, Mattox does not claim that
the admission of prior testimony or dying declarations is dependent on some kind of
testimonial analysis, but simply that the exceptions existed in 1791, and thus they are
valid confrontation exceptions. Id. at 244.
63. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 62. "[T]he rule of forfeiture by wrongdoing (which we accept)
extinguishes confrontation claims on essentially equitable grounds ... ." Id. Forfeiture
by wrongdoing is a very old confrontation exception and was well established by the
Founder's era. See, e.g., Lord Morley's Case, 6 How. St. Tr. 769, 770 (H.L. 1666); see also
MICHAEL FOSTER, A REPORT OF SOME PROCEEDINGS ON THE COMMISSION OF THE TRIAL
OF THE REBELS IN THE YEAR 1764, IN THE COUNTY OF SURRY AND OF OTHER CROWN
CASES: To WHICH ARE ADDED DISCOURSES UPON A FEW BRANCHES OF THE CROWN LAW
337 (2d ed. 1791). Given that prior depositions were usually taken by justices of the peace,
who the Court in Crawford states were the equivalent of modern police, Crawford,541 U.S.
at 52, forfeiture by wrongdoing statements clearly meet Crawford's definition of
testimonial.
64. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 58 n.8. Instead of explicitly addressing whether spontaneous
statements were an exception to confrontation, even for statements that Crawford
considers to be testimonial, Justice Scalia claims that it is "questionable" whether the
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If one considers the three confrontation exceptions for testimonial
statements acknowledged by Crawford, along with the additional
confrontation exceptions that stood under the Marian statutes, it is clear
that a significant number of confrontation exceptions existed in 1791,
even for statements that fit Crawford's definition of a testimonial
statement. A complete analysis of Crawford and the history of all the
confrontation exceptions that existed in 1791 is beyond the scope of this
Article. It must be noted, however, that Crawford's analysis of the
number of exceptions and much of its historical analysis is seriously
flawed. One of the major errors of Crawford's historical analysis is the
apparent assumption that English common law cases and state trials
were controlling authorities for law in the American colonies and that
there was one reception of English common law throughout America.
Justice Scalia refers to the English cases as having "settled" the matter
of when confrontation and cross-examination were required.65
All of the English decisions cited throughout Crawford were decisions
by courts that did not have appellate jurisdiction over the American
colonies. These cases were not controlling in America because the
appellate jurisdiction of English courts was limited to the realm of
England.66 Appellate review of American colonial courts' decisions

statements would have been admissible in 1791 because the statements had to be made
immediately and before the person could contrive anything for her advantage. His
argument only addresses the foundation for which statements qualified for the exception
in 1791. The confrontation exception did exist, even for testimonial statements, if the
proper foundation was laid, so long as the statements qualified for the spontaneous
statements exception, which the Court's citation of Thompson v. Trevanion, Skin. 402, 90
Eng. Rep. 179 (K.B. 1693), implicitly acknowledges. Id. Town constables, sheriffs, or
others whom the Court in Crawford would consider to be the equivalent of modern police,
did sometimes hear spontaneous declarations, and under those circumstances spontaneous
declarations fit Crawford's definition of testimonial. Nonetheless, spontaneous declarations
that were testimonial statements were admissible in 1791. See infra notes 120-43 and
accompanying text.
65. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 46 ("Paine had settled the rule requiring a prior
").
opportunity for cross-examination as a matter of common law..
66. See 1 SIR WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND 93
(Univ. of Chi. Press facsimile ed. 1979) (1765). "The kingdom of England, over which our
municipal laws have jurisdiction, includes not, by the common law, either Wales, Scotland,
or Ireland, or any other part of the king's dominions, except the territory of England only."
Id. "And therefore the common law of England, as such, has no allowance or authority
there [the American colonies]; they being no part of the mother country, but distinct
(though dependent) dominions." Id. at 105; see also, e.g., Pancoast's Lessee v. Addison, 1
H. & J. 350, 350-59 (1802). American colonies were "out of the realm" of England. Id. at
353. "The situation of England and Scotland before the union, was similar or nearly so to
the actual situation of Maryland and Pennsylvania. The latter were separated by an ideal
or mathematical line-the former were different realms or sovereignties-governed by
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rested solely with the monarch in Privy Council. 7 When Parliament
acted as a court, Americans believed its jurisdiction was also limited to
the kingdom of England. 8 Because appeals to the Privy Council were
rare in criminal cases, decisions of each colonial appellate court were,
almost always, final for that colony.6 9 A review of Privy Council
records from 1680 through 1783 shows the Privy Council issued no
opinions on cases appealed from the thirteen American colonies
confrontation rights or exceptions to confrontation in criminal
regarding
70
cases.

different laws." Id. at 356. The most glaring example that English common law was not
considered controlling in the colonies is, of course, slavery. In a 1772 decision, Somerset
v. Stewart, 20 How. St. Tr. 1, 80-82 (K.B. 1772), Lord Mansfield held that slavery in
England was incompatible with the common law; the case had no effect on slavery in the
colonies.
67. See BLACKSTONE, supra note 66, at 105 ("They [the American colonies] have courts
of justice of their own, from whole decisions an appeal lies to the king in council here in
England.").
68.

See JOHN PHILLIP REID, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION

281-286 (1991) (indicating that the colonialists believed Parliament did not have authority
to try colonialists for treason or other alleged crimes committed outside the realm of
England); cf. 4 SIR WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND 256

(Univ. of Chi. Press facsimile ed. 1979) (1769) ("The high court of parliament.., is the
As for acts of parliament to attaint particular persons
supreme court in the kingdom ....
of treason or felony, or to inflict pains and penalties, beyond or contrary to the common
law, to serve a special purpose, I speak not of them.").
69. See J. R. Pole, Reflections on American Law and the American Revolution, 50 WM.
& MARY Q. 123, 147 (1993) ("The laws of England were administered through a unified
But the condition of the colonies was
jurisdiction with its center in Westminster ....
fundamentally different: each of them was a separate jurisdiction. Within the very broad
limits of the prohibition against laws repugnant to the laws of England and subject to royal
disallowance, their legislatures made separate and different laws; their courts, whose
judgments were unlikely to receive attention in England, were exceptionally free to go their
own ways."). Which laws were considered to be "repugnant to the laws of England" was
in the eye of the beholder. The existence of slavery was repugnant to English common law,
yet slavery continued to exist in the colonies.
70. See 2 ACTS OF THE PRIVY COUNCIL OF ENGLAND, COLONIAL SERIES (W.L. Grant &
James Munro eds., 1910); 3 ACTS OF THE PRIVY COUNCIL OF ENGLAND, COLONIAL SERIES
(Krause 1966) (1910); 4 ACTS OF THE PRIVY COUNCIL OF ENGLAND, COLONIAL SERIES
(James Munro ed., 1911); 5 ACTS OF THE PRIVY COUNCIL OF ENGLAND, COLONIAL SERIES
(James Munro ed., 1912); see also JOSEPH HENRY SMITH, APPEALS TO THE PRIVY COUNCIL
FROM THE AMERICAN PLANTATIONS 240-56 (1965). In a review of a petition from the West
Indies, the Council reversed a sentence of a naval Court Martial and referenced that the
Lieutenant had been found guilty without knowing what crime he had been accused of and
"who was his accuser." 3 ACTS OF THE PRIVY COUNCIL, COLONIAL SERIES, supra at 794-95
(Oct. 9, 1744 and Aug. 9, 1744). The Lieutenant's Counsel, however, waived any
complaints against the procedures of the Court Martial, but only appealed from the
imposition of the sentence. See id. at 795 (Oct. 9, 1744). The Privy Council record reflects
that the Lieutenant apparently acted lawfully in not carrying out an order to shoot another
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Reception of English common law varied throughout the colonies, and
later throughout the United States, because each colony considered its
laws to be separate from the laws of other colonies."1 Some Americans
also argued that even Privy Council decisions were not binding on them
unless they agreed to and accepted such decisions.7 2 It was the American colonialist disagreement with English law and the degree to which
English law was applicable to them that led to the Revolution. 3
Accordingly, to determine which confrontation exceptions existed
before 1776 and how the confrontation right was applied in America,
Privy Council records and appellate and trial court records in each
colony should be examined. In determining the right of confrontation

Lieutenant, and it appears that there was no basis for a Court Martial to begin with.
71. See West v. Louisiana, 194 U.S. 258, 262-64 (1904) (holding that, at that time, the
Sixth Amendment did not apply to state proceedings and the states had the right to alter
their common law right of confrontation at any time and were not tied to any confrontation
procedures that existed at common law); United States v. Worrall, 2 U.S. 384, 394 (C.C.D.
Pa. 1798) (stating that each colony judged for itself which parts of the common law applied
to it: "Hence, he who shall travel through the different states, will soon discover, that the
whole of the common law of England has been no where introduced; that some states have
rejected what others have adopted; and that there is, in short, a great and essential
diversity.... The common law, therefore, of one State, is not the common law of another;
but the common law of England, is the law of each State, so far as each State has adopted
has
it... . "); Wheaton v. Peters, 29 F. Cas. 862, 871 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1832) (No. 17,486) ("[I]t
not been contended, it could not be, that the whole common law of England, as it exists
there, has ever been received in the United States, or in any one of them. Parts of it only
have been adopted, and the evidence of such adoption is to be sought in legislative acts,
in judicial decisions, or constant usage.'"). In Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965), the
Court reversed West and held the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause does apply to
the states. Id. at 406-07.
The Revolution allowed the new American states to be free from necessary dependence
on English precedent. Every state had to decide if English law remained in force in whole
or in part. See Bruce H. Mann, The EvolutionaryRevolution in American Law: A Comment
on J.R. Pole's "Reflections," 50 WM. & MARY Q. 168, 173 (1993). Several of the new
American states passed statutes that allowed English statutes and common law previously
in place to 1776 to remain subject to American innovations or variations. Id. The
reception statutes did not settle the underlying questions of which British acts applied to
the colonies in the first place or what the common law was on any particular point. Id.
72. See, e.g., Arthur M. Schlesinger, Colonial Appeals to the Privy Council, 279-97, 28
POL. SCI. Q. 279, 279-97 (March 1913) and 433-50 (June 1913) (indicating that many
colonialists disputed that the Privy Council had any appellate jurisdiction and evasion of
Council decisions was common); REID, supra note 68, at 279-80 (indicating the colonists
argued the Crown needed the consent of the colonists before English troops could legally
be placed in a colony).
73. REID, supra note 68, at 193-94 (indicating that the colonialists did not consider
themselves subject to parliamentary supremacy because the colonies were not part of the
realm of England; appeals from the colonial courts were not to the House of Lords but to
the King in Privy Council, showing that Americans were not viewed as part of the realm).

20071

CRAWFORD V. WASHINGTON

589

and its exceptions after July 4, 1776, the state appellate and trial court
records should be examined. For the Founders, English common law
cases and state trial decisions were only persuasive authorities-both
before and after the Revolution.74
Justice Scalia's numerous citations of English cases, when he should
have focused primarily on American cases, indicates perhaps the
"original intent" of English judges, but not necessarily the original intent
of the Founders. Because many states did not have published reports
of appellate decisions before 1791, the available historical evidence is
currently lacking to support Justice Scalia's sweeping claim that the law
of confrontation and its exceptions in America was "settled" before
1791. 7 5

The few American cases cited by Justice Scalia in Davis v.

Washington7" are not particularly persuasive if one is doing an originalist analysis.7 7 The apparent lack of established case law and
74. Use of English common law, of course, did play an important role in the
development of law in America. For Americans, however, English common law cases were
not considered controlling unless Americans adopted them and used them as precedents.
See, e.g., 1 ZEPHANIAH SWIFT, A SYSTEM OF THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF CONNECTIcUT 42
(Arno Press 1972) (1795) ("Our ancestors having settled this country without the aid of the
British crown, were under no obligation to obey the government, or observe the laws of the
country, from whence they emigrated ....
[The] voluntary reception of the English laws,
by general consent of the people, is the only foundation of their authority."); 2 ANTONHERMANN CHROUST, THE RISE OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION IN AMERICA 62-63 (1965) (stating
that Delaware, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, New Jersey and
Rhode Island had state constitutions which stated that only those parts of the common law
which had been developed in America after 1776 should be in force, unless otherwise
indicated). Some held that only English common law before 1601 should be considered
binding in America because that was the year colonization had begun. See CHROUST,
supra, at 61 n.203.
75. See note 78 infra and accompanying text.
76. 126 S. Ct. 2266 (2006).
77. In Davis Justice Scalia cites a few American cases to support his position that
under his use of the term "testimonial," the use of testimonial statements in 1791 required
confrontation and cross-examination at the time of trial or beforehand. See id. at 2274-75
& n.3; see also Crawford, 541 U.S. at 49-50 (indicating that Justice Scalia uses many of the
same cases cited in Davis in Crawford). In the Davis footnote, Justice Scalia cites eight
cases in which depositions of witnesses were held inadmissible. See Davis, 126 S. Ct. at
2275 n.3. All of the cases he cites were decided after the ratification of the Confrontation
Clause, and the last three cases he cites were all decided more than fifty years after the
Clause's ratification. See id. These last three cases cannot reasonably be considered to be
authorities for what the views of the Founders were in 1791. Two of these cases are not
even on point. Both People v. Newman, 5 Hill 295 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1843) and State v.
Houser, 26 Mo. 431 (1858), involve cases where courts ruled the depositions were
inadmissible because the deponent was still alive. Newman, 5 Hill at 295-96; Houser, 26
Mo. at 439-41. Under the Marian statutes, if the witness was alive and no showing of
necessity was made due to witness unavailability, the depositions would not have been
admissible either. See HAWKINS, supra note 18, at 605 (stating that a deposition is
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admissible only if the court is satisfied the witness is unable to travel).
In the other case, State v. Campbell, 30 S.C.L. (1 Rich.) 124 (1844), the court states that
it is
to modern decisions, that we are to look for our practical doctrines in respect to
evidence, in criminal as well as commercial cases, and by no means so much to the
old English cases... when a supposed felon had no counsel, no process to enforce
the attendance of his witnesses, and no right to have them sworn in court.
Id. at 130. In other words, Campbell reflects the "modern" view of 1844 and does not base
its holding on an originalist analysis of what the law was in 1791.
The five cases Justice Scalia cites that were decided within fifty years of the Confrontation Clause's ratification do not help his position either. In State v. Webb, 2 N.C. (1 Hayw.)
103 (1794), the court stated that its holding was dependent on a state statute that did not
allow for admissibility of a deposition if the defendant was not present when the deposition
was taken. See id. at 104. The court's opinion contains dicta about the common law right
of confrontation, but the court states it will not allow an exception for admissibility of the
deposition taken when the defendant was not present and the witness is unavailable at
trial when "the act has not expressly said so." Id.
In State v. Atkins, 1 Tenn. (1 Overt.) 229 (1807), the court stated that its interpretation
was based on the state constitution. See id. at 229. Atkins involved a case where the
deposition was taken in the defendant's absence. Id. If the Marian statutes had been
complied with and the deposition had been taken in the defendant's presence, it would
have been admissible. Another Tennessee case, cited by Justice Scalia, makes this clear.
In Johnston v. State, 10 Tenn. (2 Yer.) 58 (1821), where the reporter refers to the case as
in effect overruling Atkins, the court states that if the Marian procedures are complied
with, the deposition of a witness unavailable at the time of trial was admissible. See id.
at 58-59.
Finn v. Commonwealth, 26 Va. (5 Rand.) 701 (1827), merely holds that if no showing of
necessity has been made due to the witness being unavailable, as required by the Marian
statutes, then a deposition is not admissible. Id. at 708. In Finn the deponent was alive
at the time of trial but was out of the state. See id. at 707-08. State v. Hill, 20 S. C. L. (2
Hill) 607 (App. 1835), is not on point because it does not involve a deposition taken under
oath before a justice of the peace (it was taken by the Attorney General). See id. It also
involved the statements of a witness who was out of the commonwealth but still alive. The
Marian statutes required a showing of necessity and this requirement was not met in Finn
or Hill. Neither case had a claim that the unavailable witness was unable to travel. See,
e.g., HAWKINS, supra note 18, at 605 (indicating that a deposition would be admissible if
court is satisfied witness is dead, unable to travel, or kept away by procurement of the
prisoner).
Commonwealth v. Richards, 35 Mass. (18 Pick.) 434 (1837), is based on the deposition
not containing the exact words of the witness. See id. at 436-39. In Richards because the
accused was present when the deposition was taken at a preliminary examination, the
court held that no constitutional violation had occurred when the deposition was admitted
at trial. See id. at 435. Under the Marian statutes, the deposition had to contain the
witness's same words as stated before the justice of the peace. See, e.g., HAWKINS, supra
note 18, at 605 (stating that depositions are admissible at trial if "the examination offered
in evidence is the very same (g) that was sworn before the coroner or justice, without any
alteration whatsoever"). The result in Richards would have been the same under the
Marian statutes; the case simply supports the proposition that the depositions had to be
in the same words used by the witness for it to be admissible under the Marian procedures.
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published appellate decisions in America indicates that
confrontation
78
rights and exceptions were still inchoate and evolving.
The greater the number of confrontation exceptions that existed in
1791-for statements that Crawford's analysis indicates should be
testimonial-the greater the implausibility of Justice Scalia's central
holding: that the Founders intended the right of confrontation to be an
absolute bar to the admission of out-of-court testimonial statements
without confrontation and cross-examination. The significant number
of confrontation exceptions, even for statements that Crawfordconsiders
testimonial, also provides additional support for the existence of the
medical exception in 1791. After all, it was simply one of a significant
number of confrontation exceptions that existed at the time of the
Founders.

Some of these cases, including Richards, have dicta about confrontation and crossexamination, but dicta does not constitute the holding of a case. None of these cases
advances Justice Scalia's overall argument that some form of a testimonial statements test
that required cross-examination was being used.
78. Justice Scalia's historical analysis illustrates the shortcomings of using traditional
legal research methodologies in attempting to find original intent of the Founders.
Historians studying the colonists and the Founders draw mostly on manuscript court
records, "while nineteenth and twentieth century scholars-most of whom teach in law
schools--depend heavily on printed appellate decisions." Cornelia Hughes Drayton,
Turning Points and the Relevance of ColonialLegal History, 50 WM. & MARY Q. 7,9(1993).
"For the latter group, the absence of written opinions and printed court reports for the
colonial period means that precedent, doctrine, and the influence of individual judges
cannot be traced as they can for the post-1790 period." Id. at 9; see also Hendrik Hartog,
DistancingOneself From the Eighteenth Century:A Commentary on the ChangingPictures
of American Legal History, in LAW IN THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION AND THE REVOLUTION
IN THE LAw 229, 253 (Hendrik Hartog ed., 1981) (indicating that published American
appellate decisions "are simply not available ... prior to the end of the eighteenth century
....
[Liacking appellate opinions there was no way for a centralized legal structure to
control the decisions of local legal institutions").
If Justice Scalia wanted to do an actual originalist analysis, he should have examined
American colonial appellate and trial court records or manuscripts for the period before
1776 and American state appellate court and trial court records for the period after 1776
and through at least 1791. These court records should have been examined before he went
on to review English authorities that are only persuasive authority. Both John Langbein
and James Oldham have shown that review of manuscript sources can be highly useful in
discerning what the law was during certain periods. See generally John H. Langbein,
Shaping the Eighteenth Century Criminal Trial: A View from the Ryder Sources, 50 U.
CHIC. L. REV. 1 (1983); JAMES OLDHAM, THE MANSFIELD MANUSCRIPTS AND THE GROWTH
OF ENGLISH LAW IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY (1992).
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D. Under an OriginalistAnalysis the Determinationof Whether a
Statement is Testimonial Should Be Made in Light of the Founders'
Intent and the Purpose of the Confrontation Clause
Many arguments regarding which statements should be considered
testimonial ignore the originalist justification of Crawford's holding and
the purpose of the Bill of Rights.79 The Court in Crawford cites Sir
Walter Raleigh's case and other treason trials from England as examples
of government abuses that necessitated the Confrontation Clause.8 °
Crawford acknowledges that the Confrontation Clause's focus does not
apply to private parties:

79. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 43-45. The Founders were not concerned about abuses
by private prosecutors in America because, from 1776 on, private parties were not
prosecuting cases. See Randolph N. Jonakait, The Too-Easy HistoricalAssumptions of
Crawford v. Washington, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 219, 223 n.14 (2005) (stating that by the

Revolution, public prosecution in America was standard). The Founders were concerned
about abuses by federal prosecutors. See id. at 224. The Bill of Rights came into being
because of "concerns about the new federal government." Id. The Founders were not
concerned about the actions of state officials. See, e.g., Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 406
(1965) (acknowledging that the Confrontation Clause was not applied to the states until
1965).
Since the majority of criminal cases were tried before state judges, if the Founders
believed judges' rulings on admissibility of testimonial statements constituted "state
action," as Professor Richard D. Friedman argues admissibility rulings are, one would
think the Founders would have required the Confrontation Clause to apply to state judges
and not solely to the federal government. See Richard D. Friedman, Grappling With the
Meaning of Testimonial, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 241, 262 n.42 (2005). As even Professor
Friedman's citations acknowledge, the Bill of Rights usually does not apply to the action
of private parties. See id.
Other Supreme Court decisions also support limiting the application of the Bill of Rights
in the criminal justice area, including the Confrontation Clause, to the actions of law
enforcement and not extending it to private individuals unless the private individuals are
acting as agents of law enforcement. See United States v. Jacobson, 466 U.S. 109 (1984);
Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475 (1921) (indicating that the Fourth Amendment's
history shows it is intended as a restraint on the activities of sovereign authority and not
on private seizures); see also generally, 2 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK,
TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14.4, at 525 (3d ed. 1999) ("Almost all of the

constitutional protections of individual rights and liberties restrict only the actions of
governmental entities.... [T]he amendments to the Constitution which protect individual
liberties only have been applied to the actions of the state or federal governments.").
Normally, in order for statements to be suppressed, some coercive law enforcement
activity must exist. See Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167 (1986); see also United
States v. Bolden, 461 F.2d 998, 999 (8th Cir. 1972) (holding that Miranda requirements do
not apply to questioning by private persons); United States v. Wilkerson, 460 F.2d 725, 735
(5th Cir. 1972) (explaining that Miranda warnings are not required when private
investigators do questioning).
80. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 49-51.
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An accuser who makes a formal statement to government officers bears
testimony in a sense that a person who makes a casual remark to an
acquaintance does not. The constitutional text, like the history
underlying the common-law right of confrontation, thus reflects an
especially acute concern with a specific type of out-of-court statement.s"
The Court in Crawford also notes, "[T]he Framers had an eye toward
politically charged cases like Raleigh's-great state trials where the
impartiality of even those at the highest levels of the judiciary might not
be so clear." 2
In arguing that testimonial statements should not be limited to those
made to law enforcement or its agents, Professor Richard D. Friedman
states that "if we imagine a world without prosecutors ... that should
not mean the destruction of the confrontation right." 3 Public prosecution agencies will not be eliminated in the foreseeable future, however,
and it is unlikely that law enforcement will allow victim rights
organizations or private persons to take over the law enforcement
function in child abuse cases.84 Law enforcement and human services
agencies are obligated by statute to investigate child abuse cases. 5
Professor Akhil R. Amar has rightfully criticized the invocation of "the
specter of a clever private accuser seeking to get his story before the jury
while denying the accused's right to confront the accuser in the
courtroom" as something that "sidesteps a powerful counterargument

81. Id. at 51.
82. Id. at 68.
83. Friedman, supra note 79, at 262.
84. See id. It makes no sense to create definitions of testimonial based on imagined
hypotheticals that are unlikely to come true. The Supreme Court properly confines itself
to actual 'cases and controversies," which helps it to ensure the full development of cases
before it grants review. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. For many reasons, including political
ones, the prosecution function will remain in the government's hands. Even if one believed
private prosecutions could occur, agency doctrine should be able to adequately address such
situations.
85. The Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act ("CAPTA"), as amended, mandates
that all fifty states have procedures in place for investigating child maltreatment cases.
42 U.S.C. § 5106a (Supp. 112003). CAPTA states that law enforcement or human services
agencies "shall" investigate child maltreatment cases. See id. at 42 U.S.C. § 5106(b)(2)
(Supp. III 2003). State statutes also use CAPTA's mandatory language. For a summary
of such statutes, see NATIONAL CLEARINGHOUSE ON CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT
INFORMATION, 2003 CHILD ABUSE AND STATUTES SERIES STATUTES-AT-A-GLANCE:
REPORTING PROCEDURES 1-42 (2003), availableat The Child Welfare Information Gateway,
http://www.childwelfare.gov/systemwide/laws-policies/search/index.cfm (last visited Mar.
15, 2007).

594

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58

rooted in the basic principle of constitutional structure: the Constitution
is mainly addressed to state action."81
Broadening the definition of "testimonial statement" to include
statements taken not only by law enforcement, but also to its agents, 7
provides sufficient flexibility to guard against abuses. Professor
Friedman has criticized the use of agency theory by the courts on
grounds that:
refusing to deem a statement to be testimonial unless it was made to
a government agent might be mitigated by stretching the meaning of
"government agent".. . . But such manipulations are not a satisfactory
resolution of the problem because they require generous use of the
term "government agent" and because they cannot reach all situations
in any event.

18

The claim that agency doctrine cannot be used to adequately address the
issue is belied, however, by court decisions that have used agency
doctrine in determining the degree of law enforcement's involvement in
similar situations.
Courts are well-equipped to apply the doctrine of agency law in
determining whether an out-of-court statement is testimonial under
Crawford. Courts have used agency doctrine in cases to decide whether
a private party acted as an agent of police for purposes of determining
whether a Miranda warning was required and to determine whether a
search warrant was necessary.89 There is no reason why courts cannot
use agency doctrine in determining whether a statement is testimonial.
Applying the testimonial doctrine to statements, even when not made to
law enforcement or its agents, would result in an overbroad application
of the Confrontation Clause, which legal scholars have criticized.

86. Akhil R. Amar, ConfrontationFirst Principles:A Reply to ProfessorFriedman,86
GEO. L.J. 1045, 1048 (1998). Professor Amar also doubts that Friedman's related
argument-that the word "witness" as used in the Confrontation Clause includes out-ofcourt accusers-has deep roots in constitutional history: "He [Friedman] does not point to

any specific early sources of his proposal" to treat out-of-court accusers as witnesses. Id.
Amar notes that the use of other language in the Sixth Amendment and in Article III,
Section Three's Treason Clause, as well as the history of those clauses, support a definition
of "witness" that is limited to those who testify in court and not to those who make out-ofcourt statements. Id. at 1046-48. Crawford rejects Amar's position on the meaning of
"witness." See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 50-51.
87. For reasons discussed elsewhere in this Article, however, physicians should not be
considered agents of law enforcement when examining a child abuse victim for purposes
of diagnosis or treatment. See infra notes 198-222 and accompanying text.
88. Friedman, supra note 79, at 262-63.
89. See generally 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, JEROLD H. ISRAEL & NANCY J. KING, CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE §§ 6.10(c), 3.1(h) (2d ed. 1999).
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The judge should not be considered a state actor for testimonial
purposes. 90 Nor should any constitutional violation be considered to
occur when the court makes an admissibility ruling. The judge is not a
party to the litigation or a law enforcement officer; the judge does not
perform a policing role.9 ' The judge is not acting as a part of the
executive branch to protect public safety. Similarly, the court is not a
witness and does not take the statement that is being offered by the
prosecution. Court rulings on admissibility are judicial functions and
should not be considered to result in the statement being testimonial.9 2
The Court in Crawford reasoned that the Confrontation Clause protects

90. Professor Friedman argues the judge should be considered a state actor and the
trial court's admissibility rulings should be used to determine whether a statement is
testimonial. See Friedman, supra note 79, at 261-62 n.42.
91. See Fenner v. State, 846 A.2d 1020, 1025 n.4 (Md. 2004) (holding that "a judge is
not a 'law enforcement officer,' as such officers are contemplated in Miranda").
92. Justice Scalia stated that a testimonial test must be used because trial courts do
not have the ability to effectively distinguish between reliable and unreliable statements.
See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 60-65. "The Roberts test allows ajury to hear evidence, untested
by the adversary process, based on a mere judicial determination of reliability." Id. at 62.
If trial courts cannot be trusted to rule on admissibility of statements based on a reliability
standard, then arguably trial courts cannot be relied on to effectively rule on admissibility
based on determining what statements are testimonial, especially when the Court in
Crawford states that "[w]e leave for another day any effort to spell out a comprehensive
definition of 'testimonial.'" Id. at 68. Nor does Davis v. Washington appear to provide
much assistance to trial courts, as the Court declined again to give a precise definition of
"testimonial." See Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2273-74.
Without attempting to produce an exhaustive classification of all conceivable statements-or even all conceivable statements in response to police interrogation-as
either testimonial or nontestimonial, it suffices to decide the present cases to hold
as follows: Statements are nontestimonial when made in the course of police
interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that the primary purpose
of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency.
They are testimonial when the circumstances objectively indicate that there is no
such ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to
establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.
Id. at 2273-74. If trial courts do not have the ability to accurately perform reliability
analysis, they also do not have the ability to accurately determine the "primary purpose"
when police interview individuals, either during ongoing emergency situations or nonemergency situations.
If one is trying to reduce the degree to which constitutional decisions are made based on
.mere judicial determination[s] of reliability," Crawford, 541 U.S. at 62, or mere judicial
findings, Crawford and Davis have not created a new confrontation paradigm that is an
improvement over the reliability analysis as used in Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66
(1980). The Court's unwillingness to provide a clear definition of testimonial may be due
to Justice Scalia's inability to muster a majority of the Court for any one definition. The
Court's failure to provide a clear definition results in an evolving testimonial analysis used
thus far by the Court that is just as vague as the reliability analysis under Roberts.
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against the civil mode of criminal procedure, with its use of ex parte
affidavits and depositions which are made by or to executive branch
officials.9" In Crawford the Court's reasoning and the history it cites
do not show that the Founders considered a court's ruling on possible
admissibility of testimonial statements to constitute state action.94
Given that the Court in Crawford held that trial judges have
erroneously made contradictory rulings on admissibility based on
reliability,95 it is surprising to hear arguments that a trial court's
evidentiary rulings on admissibility of testimonial statements constitute
state action and should determine whether a statement is testimonial. 96
If accepted, this argument would result in statements being deemed
testimonial when admitted into evidence and not testimonial when not
admitted into evidence.97
Arguably, a witness might believe that a statement made to the police
could be used in court.9" But if a witness is not talking to law enforcement but to a private party, it is unreasonable to assume the witness
should know the statement could be used in a later criminal prosecution. 99 Furthermore, in Davis v. Washington, the Court made clear that

93. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 50.
94. Neither Professor Friedman nor the Court have cited any common law cases or
authorities from the Founders' era that hold that a trial court's actions in determining
admissibility constitute state action for purposes of determining whether a statement is
testimonial.
95. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 63-65.
96. See Friedman, supra note 79, at 261-62 & n.42. Since Crawford the lower courts
have made'contradictory holdings on which statements should be considered testimonial.
See Brooks Holland, Testimonial Statements under Crawford: What Makes Testimony...

Testimonial? 71 BROOK. L. REV. 281, 282 (2005). "Yet, as the diversity of judicial decisions
interpreting Crawford demonstrates, Crawford fails to identify a clear commonality to
'testimony' that accurately defines when a statement is 'testimonial' instead of something
else that is produced when a person speaks about facts or opinions." Id.
97. Perhaps surprisingly, Friedman rejects similar reasoning:
A standard that labeled a statement as testimonial because it was actually used
in prosecution would make no sense; it would mean that any out-of-court
statement offered by the prosecution at trial to prove the truth of what it
asserts-that is, any hearsay-is testimonial.
To determine whether a statement is testimonial, therefore, we must
figuratively stand at the time of the statement and look forward in time towards
the prosecutorial process.
Friedman, supra note 79, at 251.
98. "A statement made knowingly to the authorities that describes criminal activity is
almost always testimonial." Richard D. Friedman, Confrontation: The Search for Basic

Principles, 86 GEO. L.J. 1011, 1042 (1997).
99. Professor Friedman is right in arguing that when the witness believes the person
is a private party and has no reason to believe the person is a government agent, the
statement should not be considered testimonial even when the private party is an
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not all statements made to law enforcement will be held to be testimonial. The Court in Davis held that for purposes of its analysis, it would
consider the actions of 911 dispatchers to be actions of the police. °°
Nonetheless, because the call was made during an ongoing emergency
and was asking for assistance, the statements made by the caller were
deemed nontestimonial. 1 1
III.

DAVIS V. WASHINGTON'S ORIGINALISM

A. Under Davis 911 Calls for Medical Help Should Be Admissible
Under the Medical Exception
In Davis v. Washington, °2 the Court was given an opportunity to
further clarify its holding in Crawford. In Davis the Court had to decide
if a 911 emergency telephone call was testimonial and thus inadmissible
when the declarant was unavailable at trial.'0 3 The caller was reporting a domestic disturbance, and at some point the call was ended. The
dispatcher reversed the call and spoke to Adrian McCottry, who reported
that her boyfriend had assaulted her and had just left the residence.0 4
At the time of trial, as often happens in domestic violence cases, Ms.
McCottry did not appear to testify.0 5 The trial court allowed the 911
audiotape telephone calls to be played for the jury on grounds that the
calls constituted an exception to the hearsay rule and the Confrontation

undercover law enforcement agent.
[Ellicitation by the State is, in itself, enough to treat a person's statement as
testimonial. We might be made wary of drawing that conclusion by the fact that,
if consistently applied in the adult realm, it would presumably render subject to
the Confrontation Clause many statements made by conspirators of the accused
who did not know that their listeners were informants or undercover police
officers.... There is no persuasive reason to treat differently the human source
who, while recognizing that she is providing information in the course of the
conversation, does not regard the conversation as testimonial in nature.
Richard D. Friedman, Children as Victims and Witnesses in the Criminal Trial Process,65
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 243, 251 (2002).
100. Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2274 n.2. The Court stated, "For purposes of this opinion (and
without deciding the point), we consider [the dispatcher's] acts to be acts of the police." Id.
It must be acknowledged that Professor Friedman's arguments and analysis as cited herein
were made well before the Davis decision was handed down.
101. See id. at 2276. In filing the decision, the Court issued a joint opinion with
another case, Hammon v. Indiana. For purposes of this Article, the case will be referred
to simply as Davis v. Washington.
102. 126 S. Ct. 2266 (2006).
103. Id. at 2270-71.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 2271.
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holding that the 911 call
Clause." °6 The Court upheld the10 conviction,
7
was a nontestimonial statement.

The other case in the joint opinion, Hammon v. Indiana,°8 also
involved domestic violence. In Hammon the police were dispatched to
a reported domestic disturbance at the home of Hershel and Amy
Hammon.'0 9 When the police arrived, Ms. Hammon was on the front
porch but told them "nothing was the matter," though police observed
she appeared "somewhat frightened.""0° She gave police permission to
enter the home, and they observed broken glass that appeared to be from
a gas heating unit."' Her husband, who was in the kitchen, told
police that he and his wife had "'been in an argument'" but that
"'everything was fine now.'" 1 2 Police separated the two and spoke
privately with each of them."' Ms. Hammon signed a battery affidavit, adding by hand: "'Broke our Furnace & shoved me down on the
floor into the broken glass. Hit me in the chest and threw me down.
Broke our lamps & phone. Tore up my van where I couldn't leave the
house. Attacked my daughter.""' 4 Ms. Hammon did not appear at
trial. The defense objected to the admission of the affidavit on grounds
that it violated the defendant's right to confront and cross-examine his
accuser." 5 The Court reversed the conviction on grounds that the
affidavit was a testimonial statement." 6 The differing results in each
case can be explained by the analysis the Court used for both.
The Court's analysis in Davis appears to contain four factors: (1) the
declarant was speaking about events as they were actually happening
rather than describing past events; 117 (2) any reasonable listener would
recognize the declarant was facing an ongoing emergency;" 6 (3) the
elicited statements were necessary to resolve the present emergency
rather than simply to learn what had happened in the past;" 9 and (4)
the declarant's answers in Davis were frantic, not tranquil, and she was

106.
107.

Id.
Id. at 2276-78.

108. 126 S. Ct. 2266.
109. Id. at 2272.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2279-80.
Id. at 2276.
See id. at 2277.
Id.
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not in a safe environment; in Hammon, as in Crawford, the difference
12
in the level of formality between the two statements was striking. 1
The decision in Davis is important in analyzing the medical exception
because many 911 telephone calls involve calls for medical assistance or
are made during a medical emergency. If a caller reports an injured
child or infant who is not breathing and answers questions from the
dispatcher, including queries about how the child was injured, the entire
statement should be admissible as nontestimonial. 121 In such situations the caller is usually speaking of events as they happen and during
an ongoing emergency. Dispatcher questions about how and by whom
the child was injured are necessary for a tentative medical diagnosis, in
order for the dispatcher to decide if paramedics or an ambulance should
be sent, and to help resolve the ongoing emergency. Often the dispatcher will give advice on first aid or even instruct the caller to perform
cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) or take other action. Finally, the
medical emergency call is not made in a tranquil environment; such
statements are not the equivalent of the kind of formalized statements
in Crawford and Hammon.
Medical calls should be considered admissible under the medical
exception, especially when the dispatcher is a paramedic or an ambulance service dispatcher and even when the facts do not meet the four
factors enumerated in Davis. In making a 911 call during a medical
emergency, the medical exception should apply because the caller is
requesting medical assistance and treatment. In these situations, the
dispatcher is acting, in effect, as an agent of a physician or a hospital
and for the purpose of providing an initial medical diagnosis and medical
care. Even when the dispatcher is not a medical professional, if the
caller is seeking medical assistance or help,
the statements should be
122
admissible under the medical exception.

120. Id. at 2276-78. In Crawford the statement that was held to be testimonial was
an audiotape statement of the defendant's wife, which was taken during custodial police
interrogation and implicated the husband in an assault case. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at
38-40.
121. The primary purpose of such a call is to obtain medical assistance; thus, under
Davis,the caller's statements should be considered nontestimonial. See infra notes 241-43,
270. The dispatcher asks questions for the primary purpose of helping the caller obtain
medical care for the injured person.
122. See 2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 277, at 233-36 (John W. Strong ed., 5th ed.
1999) (stating that as long as the statements are made in order to receive medical care,
even statements made to non-physicians are admissible under the medical exception).

600

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58

B. In Davis, Under an OriginalistInterpretation,the Court Should
Have Used a Spontaneous DeclarationsAnalysis and Not a Res Gestae
Analysis
Much of the Court's analysis in Davis v. Washington shares characteristics of traditional common law spontaneous declarations or res gestae
analysis.'23 Res gestae was a somewhat muddled concept that used
one Latin phrase-meaning "things done"-to describe different types of
out-of-court statements under one label, and it later evolved into other
specific exceptions.'24 The res gestae rule held that statements made
spontaneously and concurrently with the incident were inherently
credible and admissible because they were spontaneous.'25 Res gestae
began its development as2 a confrontation exception before the ratification of the Constitution. 6
Under the four-factor analysis used by the Court in Davis, the Court's
holding can be justified on originalist grounds if one uses res gestae or
spontaneous declarations as the rationale because the statements were
made spontaneously and concurrently with the incident.2'
The
123. For example, statements made to police during an "ongoing emergency" are
admissible as nontestimonial hearsay. See Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2276-77. "A 911 call.., is
ordinarily not designed primarily to 'establish or prove' some past fact, but to describe
current circumstances requiring police assistance." Id. at 2276. "McCottry's frantic answers
were provided over the phone, in an environment that was not tranquil, or even ...safe."
Id. at 2277.
124. See Teree E. Foster, Present Sense Impressions:An Analysis and a Proposal, 10
Loy. U. CHi. L.J. 299, 304-05 (1979). An early American treatise also refers to "resgestae."
See PHILLIPPS, supra note 38, at 201-02.
125. See Note, The Present Sense Impression Hearsay Exception: An Analysis of
Contemporaneity and CorroborationRequirements, 71 NW. U. L. REV. 666, 666-67 (1976)
(indicating early decisions often required the declarations on intent and mental state to
accompany the happening of the event, but courts sometimes "lengthened" the event under
theories based on res gestae doctrine).
126. See Ship Money Case, 3 How. St. Tr. 825, 988 (1637) (stating counsel argued for
the truth of a historian as being res gestae); The Trial of John Home Tooke, 25 How. St.
Tr. 437, 440 (1794). In Aveson v. Kinnaird, the court cites the 1694 case of Thompson v.
Trevanion, Skin. 402, 90 Eng. Rep. 179 (K.B. 1694), as a case holding that out-of-court
statements may "be given in evidence as part of the resgestae." Aveson v. Kinnaird,6 East
188, 193-94, 102 Eng. Rep. 1258, 1261 (KB. 1805). Wigmore also refers to Trevanion,
which Crawford also cites, but as an example of spontaneous declarations, Crawford, 541
U.S. at 58 n.8, as the earliest use of the res gestae doctrine by an English court. See 6
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1768, at 183 (3d ed. 1940). The third edition, the last edition
written by Wigmore, focuses solely on common law cases, unlike later editions, which
incorporate federal and state rules of evidence. In doing an originalist analysis, it is
important to look at confrontation exceptions as they were in 1791, or shortly thereafter,
and not through the prism of rules of evidence, which were created well after 1791.
127. See infra notes 128-47.
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Court's analysis in Davis has the effect, however, of conflating the
common law exceptions of spontaneous declarations and res gestae into
one confrontation exception. In applying the rationale of res gestae and
spontaneous declarations analysis, without using those terms, the
Court's analysis does not follow the Founders' understanding and use of
the spontaneous declarations exception.
In implying that the victim's statements to the dispatcher might, at
some point, become testimonial and thus inadmissible, the Court in
Davis confused the requirements of the two exceptions.128 Justice
Scalia's opinion in Davis held that the utterance must be strictly
contemporaneous with the cause of the emergency and made at a time
before the exciting influence loses its effect. Wigmore considers this
contemporaneousness doctrine to be part of the "Verbal Act" doctrine and
states that it applies to only res gestae analysis.129 Under the verbal
act doctrine, utterances that accompanied the act or the conduct to
which it was desired to give legal effect were admissible. 3 ° When the
act was considered to have no intrinsic legal significance, its legal
importance or tenor could be ascertained by looking at the words that
accompanied it.'
This time limitation-requiring that the statements
accompany the verbal act--does not exist for spontaneous declarations. 132 The spontaneity of verbal declarations is dependent on the
declarant still being under
the stress or excitement produced by the
133
startling event or issue.

128. See Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2277 (2006).
In this case, for example, after the operator gained the information needed to
address the exigency of the moment, the emergency appears to have ended (when
Davis drove away from the premises). The operator then told McCottry to be
quiet, and proceeded to pose a battery of questions. It could readily be maintained
that, from that point on, McCottry's statements were testimonial ....
Id. Of course, Davis could have returned at any time. McCottry probably did not consider
the emergency "over" until the police arrived, which is probably the earliest point at which
she would have felt safe. Dispatchers usually tell the caller to stay on the line until the
police arrive because in domestic abuse calls, the dispatcher does not consider the
emergency to be over and the caller to be safe until that point.
129. See 6 WIGMORE, supra note 126, § 1750, at 142.
130. Id. § 1745, at 132-33.
131. See id.
132. Id. at 133.
133. Id. Justice Scalia also misinterprets a case that the Founder's generation might
have considered as supporting the admission of all 911 statements in Davis under a res
gestae analysis. In Davis Justice Scalia states that King v. Braiser,1 Leach 199, 168 Eng.
Rep. 202 (K.B. 1779) did not involve statements during an ongoing emergency. Davis, 126
S. Ct. at 2277. Justice Scalia notes: "The case would be helpful to Davis if the relevant
statement had been the girl's screams for aid as she was being chased by her assailant.
But by the time the victim got home, her story was an account of past events." Id. The
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Under an originalist analysis, all of a 911 tape should be admissible
if the victim is still under the stress or excitement of the influencing
event or issue, as was the victim in Davis.'34 Thompson v. Trevanion,135 which Crawford cites,136 illustrates that Justice Scalia has

confused the requirements of the two exceptions. In Trevanion the
statements were made after the wife was stabbed by the husband; they
were not made during the stabbing. 137 The case states that the wife's
statements were made "immediate[1]y upon the hurt received, and before
...she had time to devise or contrive anything for her own advantage."138

The declarant's statements must be contemporaneous with,

if anything, the pain or hurt received; it is not required that the statements be contemporaneous with the actual infliction of the injuries. The
pain and excitement caused by the stabbing did allow the wife's
statements to be admissible, and Trevanion did not impose a requirement that the verbal declarations accompany the stabbing.139 Because
the spontaneous declarations exception existed in 1791, under an
originalist analysis, all of the 911 tape should be admissible as long as
the declarant is under the stress and excitement of the event, which Ms.
McCottry was.
C. The Entire 911 Call Should Be Admissible Under Hue and Cry
Another common law doctrine that shows Justice Scalia's analysis to
be mistaken is that of "hue and cry." 4 ' During the time of the
court in Brasier did not address the issue of whether the statements were admissible as
part of an "ongoing emergency" under a resgestae analysis. Brasier,1 Leach 199, 168 Eng.
Rep. 202. Phillipp's treatise states that the statements in Brasier should be considered
part of one ongoing transaction. "So, on an indictment for a rape, what the girl said
recently after the fact, (so, that it excluded a possibility of practising on her), has been held
to be admissible in evidence, as a part of the transaction." PHi-m1PPS, supranote 38, at 202.
However, contrary to what Phillipps states, the Court in Brasierdid not actually apply res
gestae analysis because it held that normally evidence should be received from the girl
while under oath. Brasier, 1 Leach at 199, 168 Eng. Rep. at 203.
134. See Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2271 ("[Tlhe trial court admitted the recording of her
exchange with the 911 operator."); State v. Davis, 111 P.3d 844, 847 (Wash. 2005)
(indicating that the trial court found the 911 call to be admissible as an "excited
utterance").
135. Skin. 402, 90 Eng. Rep. 179.
136. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 58 n.8.
137. See Thompson, Skin. at 402, 90 Eng. Rep. at 179.
138. Id.
139. The statements in travail confrontation exception also supports this analysis. See
infra notes 157-62.
140. See MICHAEL DALTON, THE COUNTRY JUSTICE 248 (1618) (photo. reprint ed. 2003)
(stating that a woman that is "ravished" ought to raise hue and cry or complain presently
to some credible persons). "Hue and cry" also referred to raising an alarm:
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Founders, the degree to which hue and cry was admissible as a
confrontation exception was fluctuating.'
Some common law courts
of the Founders' time believed hue and cry statements were admissible
even when the declarant was unavailable.1 2 These courts considered
such hue and cry statements a form of spontaneous declarations and
thus admissible. 43 Under hue and cry, statements could be admissible

Every Justice of the Peace may cause Hue and Cry, fresh pursuit, and search to
be made, upon any Murder, Robbery, Theft, or other felony committed: and this
may be done by force.... Note, that all Hue and Cry ought to be made from town
to town, and from country to country, and by horse-men and foot-men; otherwise
it is no lawful pursuit.
Id. at 56-57. Probably the best illustration of hue and cry is from Dickens:
This was all done in a minute's space, and the very instant that Oliver began to
run, the old gentleman, putting his hand to his pocket, and missing his
handkerchief, turned sharp round. Seeing the boy scudding away at such a rapid
pace, he very naturally concluded him to be the depredator, and, shouting "Stop
thief." with all his might, made off after him, book in hand. But the old gentleman
was not the only person who raised the hue and cry....
"Stop thief! stop thiefl" There is a magic in the sound. The tradesman leaves
his counter, and the carman his waggon; the butcher throws down his tray, the
baker his basket, the milkman his pail, the errand boy his parcels, the schoolboy
his marbles, the paviour his pick-axe, the child his battledore: away they run, pellmell, helter-skelter, slip-dash, tearing, yelling, and screaming, knocking down the
passengers as they turn the corners, rousing up the dogs, and astonishing the
fowls; and streets, squares, and courts re-echo with the sound.
"Stop thief! stop thief!" The cry is taken up by a hundred voices, and the crowd
accumulate at every turning. Away they fly, splashing through the mud, and
rattling along the pavements; up go the windows, out run the people, onward bear
the mob: a whole audience desert Punch in the very thickest of the plot, and,
joining the rushing throng, swell the shout, and lend fresh vigor to the cry, "Stop
thiefl stop thiefl"
CHARLES DICKENS, OLIVER TWIST 76-77 (Philip Horne, ed., Penguin Books 2003) (1837).
141. See 5 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 210-15, 292-94 (St. George Tucker
ed., Rothman Reprints 1969) (1803) (showing that Blackstone referred to the doctrine but
did not state whether the statements were admissible only as corroboration of a woman's
testimony or came in substantively as a confrontation exception even when the declarant
was unavailable). Whether hue and cry statements could be used when the declarant was
unavailable was unsettled law, not resolved until forty-eight years after the ratification of
the Confrontation Clause. See R. v. Walker, 2 Moo. & Rob. 212, 213-14, 174 Eng. Rep. 266,
266 (Nisi Prius 1839) (stating that only the complaint itself and not the details of the rape
were admissible, and even then the complaint was only admissible for corroborative
purposes); see also 6 WIGMORE, supra note 126, § 1760, at 172.
142. See 6 WIGMORE, supra note 126, § 1760, at 171. Hue and cry statements, if taken
up by others in addition to the victim-a crowd for example-were a confrontation
exception in 1791. See, e.g., King v.Gordon, 21 How. St. Tr. 485, 535-36 (K.B. 1781); 1
STARKIE, supra note 38, at 48 (stating that the cry of a mob is admissible if the cry is part
of the transaction).
143. See WIGMORE, supra note 126, § 1760, at 171.
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after a rape as long as the victim went to the authorities as soon as
possible after the incident.'"
Emergency 911 calls bear a striking resemblance to common law hue
and cry statements. In both cases, the declarant's statements can be
made to the authorities or overheard by the authorities, and both are
usually made under the stress of an exciting event. In both cases, an
individual is calling for help and raising an alarm. There is no
requirement under hue and cry that the statements be contemporaneous
with the assault or rape itself. Justice Scalia's Davis contemporariness
requirement for 911 calls is not historically accurate when applied to
statements that would have been admissible in 1791 as hue and cry or
spontaneous declarations. If one uses an originalist analysis, Justice
Scalia's Davis contemporariness analysis is mistaken unless one confines
oneself solely to the Court's interpretation of res gestae analysis.' 4
But the Court in Davis does not refer to spontaneous declarations, hue
and cry or res gestae analysis, because acknowledging that additional
confrontation exceptions existed in 1791 undercuts the Court's own
historical analysis in Crawford,which claims that the only confrontation
exception for testimonial statements in 1791 was dying declarations.14 6

144. Justice Scalia's Crawford analysis indicates that the Founders would have
considered statements to police to be less reliable than statements made to others. See
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52-53. The actual use of hue and cry in 1791 illustrates that Justice
Scalia's analysis is mistaken. Statements under hue and cry were considered more reliable
when made to the authorities as soon as possible after the event. See 5 BLACKSTONE, supra
note 141, at 210-15. Because hue and cry statements could be made to constables or
justices of the peace, the Founders would not have considered law enforcement
involvement, in itself, to have made the statements less reliable. Constables did exist in
England during the time of the Founders; if Justice Scalia's analysis is correct, hue and cry
statements to constables, or overheard by constables, would have been considered less
reliable-not more reliable.
145. Even under an originalist res gestae analysis, the Court's reasoning is questionable. The 911 telephone call constitutes one ongoing transaction, and the caller was
relaying the "immediate terror of personal violence" that occurred from the actions of the
perpetrator. See, e.g., Aveson, 6 East at 193-94, 102 Eng. Rep. at 1261. Under res gestae
analysis, the entire phone call should be admissible-whether the dispatcher asked
questions or not. During the time of the Founders, when a perpetrator was still at large,
the length of the ongoing transaction under res gestae or hue and cry analysis did not end
simply because a constable at the scene asked questions of the victim. During a chase of
a perpetrator, one can readily envision a constable, or crowd, asking the victim questions,
such as: Which way did the perpetrator go? How was he dressed? What did he look like?
What happened?
146. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 56 n.6.
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It appears that the Davis case, one the Court purportedly uses to clarify
the law, may result in the revival of the res gestae doctrine.'4 7

IV. THE MEDICAL EXCEPTION EXISTED IN THE FOUNDERS' ERA
A. The Medical Exception Evolved from the Present Sense Impression
Exception
A careful review of the law shows that statements under a medical
exception were considered admissible at the time of the Founders and
were admitted especially in murder and rape cases.'" The medical
exception evolved from the "present sense impression" and "present

147. The res gestae doctrine, although in existence in 1791, became less commonly used
in the twentieth century because "[t~he exposition of this Exception might well be
approached with a feeling akin to despair. There has been such a confounding of ideas,
and such a profuse and indiscriminate use of the shibboleth 'res gestae', that it is difficult
to disentangle the real basis of principle involved." 6 WIGMORE, supra note 126, § 1745,
at 131.
148. See Earl of Pembroke's Trial, 6 How. St. Tr. 1309, 1325, 1327, 1331, 1336, 1346
(1678) (holding that statements regarding pain and cause of a wound by a dying man to
bystanders and physician admissible: "[Tihere are little circumstances, which are always
allowed for evidence in such cases, where men receive any wounds to ask them questions
while they are ill, about it, who hurt them."); Cannings Trial, 19 How. St. Tr. 283, 478
(1754); Aveson, 6 East 186, 102 Eng. Rep. 1258 (K.B. 1805) (upholding the admission of
statements of an unavailable witness based on the medical exception).
It was then objected by the plaintiffs counsel that what she [the patient] said was
not evidence: but the learned Judge admitted the evidence, considering that what
the surgeon called on the part of the plaintiff had sworn as to the state of health
of Mrs. Aveson was in a great measure founded on her answers to his inquiries,
and as in general any opinion of the state of health of a person must partly be
formed on the account which such person gives of his complaints.
Aveson, 6 East at 189, 102 Eng. Rep. at 1259.
The opinion of a medical man upon the state of a person's health, which is the
object of inquiry, is evidence per se from the necessity of the case; therefore the
grounds of his opinion are collaterally let in as evidence also, in which light only
the answers of the wife to his inquiries become examinable. And there is less
ground for suspicion of the truth of such answers given to a professional man,
whose advise is presumed to be asked with a view to be acted upon, and where the
party therefore has a direct personal interest to answer truly, than where loose
conversations are held with other persons, from which no consequence is expected
to ensue.
Id. at 194, 102 Eng. Rep. at 1261; see also Stephen Landsman, One Hundred Years of
Rectitude: Medical Witnesses at the Old Bailey, 1717-1817, 16 LAw & HIST. REV. 445,44594 (1998); THOMAS FORBES, SURGEONs AT THE BAILEY: ENGLISH FORENSIC MEDICINE To
1878, 89, 107-08 (1985).

606

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58

mental state" exceptions.'4 9
Initially, the common law admitted
spontaneous expressions of pain and suffering without regard to whom
the declarant made the statements. 5 0 A spontaneous statement of
pain and suffering, even as related by someone other than the injured
person, was considered to offer the best evidence of the suffering and its
true character; the declarant's reconstruction of the pain in the
courtroom was considered less trustworthy than statements made while
the person felt the injury. 5 '
Common law courts generally recognized the present sense impression
exception, but few common law courts explicitly distinguished it from
spontaneous declarations or res gestae. 51 2 Crawford acknowledges that
the spontaneous declarations exception existed in 179 1.153 Statements
to physicians often were just as spontaneous as statements to witnesses
of an injury, because the declarant, who was often in pain, would blurt
out the truth with no dissembling.'54 Necessity also justified admission of the statements because no one else but the patient could describe
where or when the patient felt the pain or report another individual's
present sense impressions or subjective mental state. 155

149. See, e.g., Tooke, 25 How. St. Tr. at 440; Rawson v. Haigh, 2 Bing. 99, 130 Eng.
Rep. 242 (C.P. 1824); see also The Present Sense Impression HearsayException, supra note

125, at 666-77 (early decisions often required that the declarations of intent and mental
state accompany the happening of the event, but courts sometimes "lengthened" the event
under theories based on the res gestae doctrine). Sometimes the statements were
considered admissible because present sense impressions and state of mind exceptions were
not considered to be hearsay. The PresentSense Impression HearsayException, supra note

125, at 634.
150. See, e.g., Goodwin v. Harrison, 1 Root 80, 81 (Conn. 1781) (allowing the mother
in a civil action to state the daughter's complaints as an exception to hearsay "founded
upon the necessity of the case"); see also William H. Theis, The Doctor as Witness:
Statements for Purposes of Medical Diagnosis or Treatment, 10 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 363
(1979).
151. Theis, supra note 150, at 363-64.
152. See Foster, supra note 124, at 304-05. An early American treatise also refers to
res gestae. See PHILLIPPS, supra note 38, at 201-02; see also 6 WIGMORE, supra note 126,
§§ 1747-51.
153.

See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 58 n.8.

154. Theis, supra note 150, at 364.
155. See Aveson, 6 East at 194-95, 102 Eng. Rep. at 1261.
The opinion of a medical man upon the state of a person's health, which is the
object of the inquiry, is evidence per se from the necessity of the case; therefore,
the grounds of his opinion are collaterally let in as evidence also, in which light
only the answers of the wife to his inquiries become examinable.... What were
the complaints, what the symptoms, what the conduct of the parties themselves
at the time, are always received in evidence upon such inquiries, and must be
resorted to from the very nature of the thing.
Id.; see also Mosteller, supra note 5, at 260 n.8.
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Another early common law exception, whose rationale was similar to
res gestae and present sense impressions, was the exception for
statements in travail. The statements in travail exception used the
reasoning that such statements were similar to spontaneous declarations, and the painful circumstances provided some guarantee of
sincerity. 6' Statements in travail were statements made by a woman
from the time the pains of childbearing commenced until her delivery. 5 7 A mother's statements made while in labor, naming and
accusing the father, were admissible at trials in "bastardy" cases. 5 '
Cases involving statements in travail were considered to be criminal in
nature and an exception to confrontation; they were admissible under
American common law during the 1600s and 1700s. 159 English
common law also recognized the exception. 6 ° The other rationale for
admissibility was necessity. Necessity was considered to exist because
the mother was sometimes disqualified as an interested party. 61 Both
American and English cases show that the statements in travail
exception to confrontation existed in 1791.
One reason for the exceptions of spontaneous declarations or res
gestae, present sense impressions, statements in travail, and the medical
exception, was that they shared a common characteristic. These
declarations were often made "immediat[ely] upon the hurt received and
before [the declarant] had time to devise or contrive anything for her
own advantage."16 2

156.
157.

See 4 WIGMORE, supra note 126, § 1141, at 230-31.
See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 27, at 1344.

158. See, e.g., Hitchcock v. Grant, 1 Root 107, 108 (Conn. 1788) ("charging the man in
the time of her travail an essential requisite"); Warner v. Wiley, 2 Root 490, 490 (Conn.
1788) (stating that John had begotten her with child "in fornication" and "was arrested");
Davis v. Salisbury, 1 Day 278, 282 (Conn. 1804) (indicating that these cases are criminal
in nature); Drowne v. Stimpson, 2 Mass. 441, 443 (1807) (stating that the suit is based on
"'[an Act for the punishment of fornication, and for the maintenance of bastard children'"); Commonwealth v. Cole, 5 Mass. 517, 518 (1809) (indicating that the mother is
"particepscriminis" to the fornication).

159. See 4 WIGMORE, supra note 126, § 1141, at 230-31; see also Helen Brock &
Catherine Crawford, Forensic Medicine in Early Colonial Maryland, 1633-83, in LEGAL
MEDICINE IN HISTORY 25, 36 (Michael Clark & Catherine Crawford, eds. 2004). "The birth
of a bastard was proof of illicit sex and was investigated as a crime but also because it was
feared that the child would become a charge on the community." Brock & Crawford, supra,
at 36. "[A] considerable number of such cases were brought to court, mainly on the basis
of hearsay and circumstantial evidence." Id.
160. See, e.g., Bishop of Lincoln's Trial, 3 How. St. Tr. 769, 773 (1637).
161. See 4 WIGMORE, supra note 126, § 1141, at 230.
162. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 58 n.8 (quoting Thompson v. Trevanion, Skin. 402, 90 Eng.
Rep. 179 (K.B. 1694)).
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B. In Giving a Medical Diagnosis or Opinion, Physicians Could
Testify About Patient's Out-of-Court Statements If the Physician Relied
on Them In Forming the Opinion
By the time of the Founders, physicians in England were allowed to
Physicians were also allowed
give expert opinions when testifying."t
to offer expert opinions in America.16 Medical experts gave opinions
on insanity that were based on out-of-court statements of witnesses who
65
Physicians also offered opinions on cause of death
did not testify."
in infanticide cases, the cause of death or illness in poisoning cases, and
the cause of inflammations. 1" Physicians were also allowed to testify

163. See Folkes v. Chadd, 3 Doug. 157, 157,99 Eng. Rep. 589, 589 (KB. 1783) (holding
by Lord Mansfield stating that those with special training in the sciences can give an
expert opinion); see also, e.g., 1 GEOFFREY GILBERT, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 301 (1791);
PEAKE, supra note 45, at 137 (stating that a physician may give an opinion on the effects
of a disease and its consequences); FORBES, supra note 148, at 40-48 (stating that medical
experts, including midwives, began testifying as early as the thirteenth century, and the
practice was well established in England in the Middle Ages); David Harley, The Scope of
Legal Medicine in Lancashireand Cheshire,1660-1760, in LEGAL MEDICINE IN HISTORY 45
(Michael Clark & Catherine Crawford, eds. 2004) (midwives and medical men had been
called upon for centuries to give expert testimony even though there were no treatises on
legal medicine until the late eighteenth century).
164. See Brock & Crawford, supra note 159, at 25-44; SHARON BLOCK, RAPE AND
SEXUAL POWER IN EARLY AMERICA 111-13 (2006) (indicating that trial manuscripts from
the 1700's show physicians gave opinions on whether an alleged victim's injuries were
consistent with rape). Additional early American cases, although later than 1791, also
show that the practice of allowing physicians to give opinions was widely accepted. See,
e.g., Hathorn v. King, 8 Mass. 371, 371-72 (1811) ("The physicians may be inquired of,
whether, from the circumstances of the patient, and the symptoms they observed, they are
capable of forming an opinion of the soundness of her mind, and if so, whether they from
thence conclude that her mind was sound or unsound; and in either case, they must state
the circumstances or symptoms from which they draw their conclusions."); Dickinson v.
Barber, 9 Mass. 225, 225-26 (1812) (stating that depositions of physicians in a civil insanity
case must state facts upon which the opinion is based to be admissible and facts either
they or others testified to).
165. See JOEL P. EIGEN, WITNESSING INSANITY: MADNESS AND MAD DOCTORS IN THE
ENGLISH COURT 133-60 (1995); 1 NIGEL WALKER, CRIME AND INSANITY IN ENGLAND: THE
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 66-72 (1968); see generally R.A. HOUSTON, MADNESS AND SOCIETY
IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY SCOTLAND (2000); ROY PORTER, MIND-FORGD MANACLES: A
HISTORY OF MADNESS IN ENGLAND FROM THE RESTORATION TO THE REGENCY (1987); DANA
RABIN, IDENTITY, CRIME AND LEGAL RESPONSIBILITY IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND
(2004).
166. See, e.g., 1 LEONARD MAcNALLY, THE RULES OF EVIDENCE ON PLEAS OF THE
CROWN 329-35 (Philadelphia, P. Byrne 1804); Catherine Crawford, The Emergence of
English Forensic Medicine: Medical Evidence in Common Law Courts, 1730-1830 (April
1987) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Oxford University) (on file with the Author).
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about what a child rape victim stated, even when the child did not
testify under oath.'67
Connecticut may have allowed a child witness's out-of-court statement
to be admissible at trial, at least if the out-of-court statement was under
oath:" "In England, it has been decided, that on an indictment for a
rape, the deposition of a girl taken before the committing magistrate and
signed by him, may, after her death be read in evidence... provided she
was sworn, and appeared competent . ."169

167. See, e.g., LANGBEIN, ORIGINS, supra note 21, at 239-41 & n.277 (stating that Old
Bailey Sessions papers show that in 1726, 1741, and in 1753, physicians were allowed to
state what the child told them about being raped even though the child did not testify).
In America, it appears that physicians were also allowed to testify about what they were
told by children who had been raped. See, e.g., JULIUS GOEBEL, JR. & T. RAYMOND
NAUGHTON, LAW ENFORCEMENT IN COLONIAL NEW YORK 645 n.140 (1944) (citing Trial of
James Gaines, Ms. Mins. SCJ. 1754-57 (Engr.) 112, 115, 116) (indicating child also testified
but not under oath).
Some who adopt an originalist methodology might argue one should not cite historical
sources after 1791, because the Founders could not have consulted authorities published
beyond that date. Crawford, however, cites a large number of materials published after
1791 for the proposition that these materials are authorities for what the Founders' views
were in 1791. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 49-50. The Court in Davis also cites a number
of materials published after 1791. Because an originalist like Justice Scalia refers to
materials published after 1791 in his opinions, Justice Scalia and originalist defenders of
Crawford and Davis can hardly consistently argue that it is inappropriate for others to do
so. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 47 n.2, 49, 50-51; see also Davies, supra note 20, at 193
n.291.
This Article does cite several sources published after 1791 as authority that the medical
exception to confrontation existed in 1791. Citation of these sources is justifiable. First,
unlike many of the materials cited by Justice Scalia, the original historical sources cited
as authorities for this article were published shortly after 1791, and all were published
within thirty-seven years of the Confrontation Clause's ratification. A significant number
of the Founders, including those at the state ratifying conventions, lived for several decades
after 1791. It is only reasonable to assume that if these Founders, and those who ratified
the amendment in the state conventions, thought that the existence of the medical
exception violated the "original understanding" of the Confrontation Clause and its
exceptions, they would have publicly indicated such.
Nor should one attempting to discern the views of the Founders limit oneself only to
materials written by 1791 for the Founders' views of the Bill of Rights, or 1788 for their
views of the Constitution. See, e.g., HAROLD HOLZER, LINCOLN AT COOPER UNION: THE
SPEECH THAT MADE ABRAHAM LINCOLN PRESIDENT (2004) (indicating that Abraham
Lincoln researched the views of the Founders by relying on many sources, including those
written after 1788, to make a persuasive argument that the Founders did not support the
expansion of slavery into the territories).
168. See ZEPHANIAH SWImT, A DIGEST OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL AND CIVL
CASES 125-26 (Arno Press 1792) (1810).
169. Id. at 125-26. Zephaniah Swift's well-known American treatise cites as its
authority King v. Flemming and Windham, 2 Leach. 854, 168 Eng. Rep. 526 (Cr. App.
1799). Importantly, in Flemming and Windham's Case, the assize trial judge cited the
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Other American jurisdictions may have allowed very young children
to testify even when not under oath. 7 ' It appears that these American
jurisdictions did not follow the English case that is often cited for the
rule that all testimony must be given under oath.' 7' Instead, these
jurisdictions may have accepted Sir Matthew Hale's position that the
necessity of the oath should not be required when very young children
have been sexually assaulted. Hale, a widely respected former Lord
Chief Justice of the Court of King's Bench, believed that even if the child
did not have the ability to understand the oath, the child should still be
allowed to testify because of necessity.'72
Printed reports of early American appellate court decisions were not
widely available until after 1791.173

One can nonetheless glean an

understanding of early American law by reviewing American justice of
the peace manuals. 174 Several of these early manuals describe the
medical exception, indicating that physicians could give opinions based
on the statements of others: "[P]ersons of skill may speak not only as to
facts, but may give their opinions in evidence. Thus, the opinion of a
medical man is evidence as to the state of a patient.",17 A Pennsylvania manual indicated, "Though witnesses can in general speak only as
to facts, yet in questions of science, persons versed in the subject, as
physicians, may deliver their opinions upon oath, on the case proved by
the other witnesses." 17'

A

Massachusetts manual stated, "Thus a

Marian statutes for his authority to allow the girl's earlier sworn statement to be admitted
even though the girl had not signed the deposition. 2 Leach at 855, 168 Eng. Rep. at 52627.
170. See JOHN HAYWOOD, THE DUTY AND AUTHORITY OF JUSTICES OF THE PEACE IN THE
STATE OF TENNESSEE 68 (1810) (stating that if a child under twelve does not understand
the obligations of the oath "she ought to be heard without oath to give the court
information," but additional evidence must be added in order to convict); JAMES PARKER,
THE CONDUCTOR GENERALIS: OR, THE OFFICE, DUTY AND AUTHORITY OF JUSTICES OF THE
PEACE 140 (1792) (especially in rape cases and "such crimes as are practiced on children,"
young children may be examined without oath); HENRY POTTER, THE OFFICE AND DUTY OF
A JUSTICE OF THE PEACE, AND A GUIDE TO SHERIFFS, CORONERS, CLERKS, CONSTABLES, AND
OTHER CIVIL OFFICERS ACCORDING TO THE LAWS OF NORTH CAROLINA 256 (Raleigh, Joseph
Gales 1816) (indicating that even if a child does not understand the oath, she should testify
anyway, but there should be concurrent evidence in order to convict).
171. See King v. Brasier, 1 Leach 199, 168 Eng. Rep. 202 (KB. 1779). Given that
Brasierwas decided three years after the Declaration of Independence, it should not be
surprising that states did not follow its reasoning.
172. See HALE, supra note 19, 634-35. Hale also argued that in such cases there must
be concurrent evidence of the offense having occurred. See id. at 634.
173. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 79, 282-92 (1973).
174. See id. at 287.
175. THE NEW HAMPSHIRE JUSTICE OF THE PEACE 165 (Concord, Isaac Hill 1824).
176. GRAYDON, supra note 54, at 118.
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physician who has not seen the particular patient, may, after hearing
the evidence of others, be called to prove on his oath, the general effects
of the disease described by them; and its probable consequences in the
particular case ... ,77
According to an early, well-recognized evidence treatise by Phillipps:
In general, the opinion of a witness is not evidence: he must speak to
facts. But on questions of science or trade, or others of the same kind,
persons of skill may speak not only as to facts, but are allowed also to
give their opinions in evidence. Evidence of character is founded on
opinion, and an opinion of a medical man is evidence as to the state of
a patient. 7 8
Phillips also states, "On trials for murder, by poisoning, the evidence of
medical men is frequently required to determine, whether the deceased
came to his death by poison." 79 Phillips also states, "Where the
opinions of physicians are given in evidence, the facts on which they
ground their opinions must be stated."8 ° The first treatise on evidence
law written by an American specifically referred to surgeons and those
having medical skills as being able to give opinions based "upon a
consideration of all the symptoms and circumstances of the case.""8 '
Statements under the medical exception should also be admissible
today because, even under an originalist analysis, confrontation and
cross-examination was not always considered necessary, especially in
cases involving the sexual assault of children.8 2 Zephaniah Swift's
treatise on evidence law indicates that even as late as 1810, statements
admissible under the Marian statutes were considered to create
exceptions to confrontation and cross-examination when necessity
existed, such as the unavailability of a child rape victim who died before
trial. 8 3 Phillipps and Swift's citations of the 1799 Flemming and

177. RODOLPHUS DICIGNSON, A DIGEST OF THE COMMON LAW, THE STATUTE LAWS OF
MASSACHUSETTS, AND OF THE UNITED STATES, AND THE DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME
JUDICIAL COURT OF MASSACHUSETTS, RELATIVE TO THE POWERS AND DUTIES OF THE
JUSTICES OF THE PEACE 131 (Deerfield, John Wilson 1818).
PHILLIPPS, supra note 38, at 208.
179. Id. at 208-09 n.(b).
180. Id.
181. 1 THOMAS STARKIE, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 73 (2d ed.
178.

1828).
182.

See generally LANGBEIN, ORIGINS, supra note 21, at 238-42. "The Old Bailey also
tolerated flagrant hearsay in rape prosecutions involving a child victim who was not
competent to testify because she was too young to appreciate the significance of her oath."
Id. at 239.
183. See SWIFT, supra note 168, at 125-26. Phillipps's first American edition was
published in 1816, and it cited Flemming and Windham's Case. PHILLIPPS, supra note 38,
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Windham's Case shows that the doctrine of the case was known in the
newly independent United States.
C. The Medical Exception Allowed Physicians to Testify About the
Out-of-Court Statements of Patients Even When the Statements of
Patients Were Not Made Under Oath
One commentator argues that physicians in 1791 were allowed to give
an opinion based only on evidence introduced through testimony that
was given under oath in the courtroom." 4 While there are some cases

at 277 n.1.
184. See Ross A. Oliver, Testimonial Hearsay as the Basis for Expert Opinion: The
Intersection of the ConfrontationClause and FederalRule of Evidence 703 After Crawford
v. Washington, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 1539, 1548-49 (2004).
"The expert witness could testify only if necessary to provide information that was
beyond the ken of the average juror, could testify only in response to a hypothetical question, could not assume anything that was not already in evidence, and
could not offer an opinion on the ultimate issue before the jury."
Experts at common law were likewise limited in the information upon which
they could base their opinion to personally known facts or facts in evidence
presented in the expert's presence or through a hypothetical question.
Id. at 1548.
Mr. Oliver's authorities for his argument consist of one 1901 law review article and a
1998 evidence law treatise. See id. at 1548 n.61. Although the evidence law treatise he
cites does refer to one 1760 case, that case stands only for the proposition that the
physician must specify the specific facts already in evidence upon which the surgeon bases
his opinion. See Rex v. Ferrers, 19 How. St. Tr. 886, 942-44 (1760).
A case Oliver appears to rely on, United States v. Dukaglini, 326 F.3d 45 (2d Cir. 2002),
actually affirmed the defendant's conviction and found that if any error occurred, it was
harmless. See id. at 59-63. In Dukagiini the court acknowledged that expert testimony can
stray over the line into violating confrontation rights if the conclusions are too sweeping
and rely too much on inadmissible out-of-court statements. See id. at 53. The court also
stated, however, that normally "'expert witnesses can testify to opinions based on hearsay
or other inadmissible evidence if experts in the field reasonably rely on such evidence in
forming their opinions. .. .'" Id. at 57 (quoting United States v. Locasio, 6 F.3d 924, 938
(2d Cir. 1993)). The doctrine of allowing the testimony to be admissible if experts in the
field reasonably rely on it is an old one. See, e.g., Aveson, 6 East 186, 102 Eng. Rep. 1258.
"And there is less ground for suspicion of the truth of such answers given to a professional
man, whose advise is presumed to be asked with a view to be acted upon, and where the
party therefore has a direct personal interest to answer truly. . . ." Id. at 194, 102 Eng.
Rep. at 1261. "Vhat were the complaints, what the symptoms, what the conduct of the
parties themselves at the time, are always received in evidence upon such inquiries, and
must be resorted to from the very nature of the thing." Id. at 195, 102 Eng. Rep. at 1261.
Professor Mosteller also raises similar concerns about expert witnesses-especially
physicians-and confrontation exceptions, but he also focuses on the differences between
the Federal Rules of Evidence and common law at the time the rules were adopted. See
Mosteller, supra note 5. For an argument similar to Oliver's, but one that focuses on
laboratory reports, see Bradley Morin, Science, Crawford, and Testimonial Hearsay:
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that are ambiguous on this point, the overall historical record is not.
First, a significant number of cases allowed physicians to form an
opinion and give a medical diagnosis based on out-of-court statements
that clearly were not under oath.185 A physician could give an opinion
based on out-of-court statements if he had personally heard the out-ofcourt statements when they were made; the physician could through his
own testimony put the out-of-court statements into evidence by testifying
under oath about what the patient had told him.8 Physicians were
not limited to hypothetical questions but could actually state their
opinion of a diagnosis of a particular person or the specific cause of
8 7
death."
Second, widely accepted confrontation exceptions, such as
dying declarations, spontaneous statements or res gestae, past recollection recorded,1 8' and co-conspirator statements, did allow the admissibility of out-of-court statements that had not been made under oath.
Prior statements admitted under the forfeiture by wrongdoing Confrontation Clause exception were admitted when made under oath and were
admissible even if not under oath."'

Applying the ConfrontationClause to LaboratoryReports, 85 B.U. L. REV. 1243 (2005). For
a further response to these types of arguments, see Paul R. Rice, Inadmissible Evidence as
a Basis for Expert Opinion Testimony: A Response to Professor Carlson, 40 VAND. L. REV.
583 (1987).
185. See, e.g., Earl of Pembroke's Trial, 6 How. St. Tr. at 1325-36 (holding that a dying
man's statements not under oath when made to a doctor were admissible); Cannings Trial,
19 How. St. Tr. at 478; Aveson, 6 East at 189, 102 Eng. Rep. at 1259 (holding that an
unavailable witness's statements that were not under oath when made to her doctor were
admissible under the medical exception).
186. See Aveson, 6 East at 189, 102 Eng. Rep. at 1259.
187. See supra notes 159-79 and accompanying text.
188. Statements under past recollection recorded were admissible even though the
statements were not always made under oath. The exception was widely used by 1791.
See, e.g., Scroop's Trial, 5 How. St. Tr. 1034 (1660); Sir Henry Vane's Trial, 6 How. St. Tr.
119 (1662). The early English common law cases tended to conflate present recollection
refreshed with past recollection recorded; however, by the time of the ratification of the
Confrontation Clause, the two concepts were beginning to be distinguished. Past
recollection recorded statements were admissible even if not taken on oath. See, e.g.,
Ryerson v. Grover, 1 N.J.L. 459 (1795); Pigot v. Holloway, 1 Binn. 436 (Pa. 1808).
189. The Court in Crawford states that it accepts the use of the forfeiture by
wrongdoing exception to confrontation by the Court in Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S.
145 (1879). Crawford, 541 U.S. at 62. Reynolds is an example where the prior statements
were been made under oath. In Motes v. United States, the Court indicated that
depositions that were neither cross-examined nor taken under oath would violate
confrontation unless procurement had occurred. 178 U.S. 458, 471-74 (1900). The Court
in Davis reiterated the Court's language in Crawford that forfeiture by wrongdoing is an
exception to the Confrontation Clause. Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2279-80. The Court also
suggested that it might accept the preponderance of the evidence standard of proof in
forfeiture cases and that hearsay would be admissible at such hearings. See id.; see
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Commentators have argued that under Federal Rule of Evidence 703,
a modern expert can rely on facts that are not testified to in court but
cannot state the specific facts upon which the expert bases his or her
opinion unless those facts are already in the record. 19° It is claimed
that in criminal cases, this information, if not in the record, is testimonial hearsay because the facts or data on which the expert depends may
be unreliable. 9 ' Although experts can be cross-examined about their
opinions, there is a danger the jury will accept the facts upon which the
experts reached their opinions as truthful, not as merely the facts used
to form an opinion.'9 2 This argument is in part based on the claim
that under the common law, hearsay was not an acceptable basis for
expert testimony. But the historical record shows that under common
law in 1791, such statements were admissible when the physicians
testified about them and used them to help them form their opinion.'93
Furthermore, under an originalist analysis of testimonial statements, it
is not the common law of the 1970s that existed at the time the federal
rules of evidence were created that is of importance, but the confrontation exceptions under common law that existed in 1791.
D. Confrontation and Cross-Examinationof the Patient's Out-ofCourt Statements Was Not Required
An English case from 1779, King v. Brasier,"9 can be misinterpreted
to mean that no testimony could be admitted without confrontation and
cross-examination. A careful reading of Brasier, however, shows that
this interpretation is inaccurate. In Brasier the mother and a lodger
testified about what a girl told them about a sexual assault. The court
ruled that because no testimony can be received except upon oath, the
conviction had to be reversed.' 95 If the girl had testified under oath
generally Tom Harbinson, Using the Crawford v. Washington "Forfeitureby Wrongdoing"
Confrontation Clause Exception in Child Abuse Cases, REASONABLE EFFORTS, vol. 1, No. 3
(2004), available at http://www.ndaa.org/publications/newsletters/reasonable-efforts-vol
ume__number_ 3 2004.html (last visited Mar. 15, 2007).
190. See Oliver, supra note 184, at 1550-53.
191. Id. at 1553.
192. See id. at 1555.
193. Under common law, physicians were required to state the underlying facts upon
which they based their opinion or diagnosis. See, e.g., Aveson, 6 East at 188-89, 102 Eng.
Rep. at 1259 (holding that testimony of a surgeon was proper when he was able to state
specific facts upon which he based his opinion, including what the patient told him about
her condition); Hathorn, 8 Mass. at 371-72 (indicating that physicians must state facts or
symptoms from which they draw their conclusions); PH1LLIPPS, supra note 38, at 208-09
n.(b).
194. 1 Leach 199, 168 Eng. Rep. 202 (K.B. 1779).
195. Id. at 200, 168 Eng. Rep. at 202.
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and if a record showed that she understood the oath, that evidence could
have been received.19 6 If one reads Brasier along with Flemming and
Windham's Case, which was decided in 1799, it is clear that Brasier
stands only for the rule that testimony normally should be received on
oath. Brasier does not stand for the rule that confrontation and crossexamination is always required at trial because Flemming and
Windham's Case upheld the admissiblity of a sworn deposition in a child
rape case when the victim was dead, even though no cross-examination
occurred at the time the deposition was taken or at trial.
Brasieralso does not stand for the rule that all testimony must always
be under oath, because courts continued to uphold the use of dying
declarations, spontaneous declarations or res gestae, past recollection
recorded, statements in travail, and coconspirator statements-all of
which existed as confrontation exceptions by 1791. None of these
exceptions required that the out-of-court statements be made under oath.
Under the common law in 1791, there was no absolute requirement that
all statements be made under oath and testified to in the courtroom. To
be considered evidence, statements usually had to be under oath, but
common law doctrine had exceptions based on necessity. The existence
of the exceptions that allowed statements not made under oath to be
admissible in 1791 also supports the view that statements under the
medical exception did not have to be made under oath and based solely
on testimony in the courtroom.
V.

STATEMENTS UNDER THE MEDICAL EXCEPTION ARE NOT
TESTIMONIAL

A.

PhysiciansAre Not Law Enforcement Agents
In Davis v. Washington,97 the Court indicated that in applying the
Court's analysis of confrontation in Crawford and its determination of
whether out-of-court statements are testimonial, the Court would
consider whether the individuals to whom the statements are made are
agents of law enforcement. 98 Courts are beginning to address whether

196. See id., 168 Eng. Rep. at 202-03.
197. 126 S. Ct. 2266 (2006).
198. The Court in Davis stated:
If 911 operators are not themselves law enforcement officers, they may at least be
agents of law enforcement when they conduct interrogations of 911 callers. For
purposes of this opinion (and without deciding the point), we consider their acts
to be acts of the police .... [Olur holding today makes it unnecessary to consider
whether and when statements made to someone other than law enforcement
personnel are "testimonial."
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physicians can act as agents of law enforcement, thus rendering any
statements made to physicians testimonial.19 9 In several cases it has
been argued that when a law enforcement officer takes a child to the
physician, the police officers, physicians, and victims all believe the
statements could be used in a later criminal prosecution, thus making
the physician an agent of law enforcement.2"
The argument that physicians are agents of law enforcement in this
context is inconsistent with fundamental principles of agency law.
Agency requires a free choice on the part of the agent in entering into
the agency relationship with the principal. 21 An agency relationship
also requires that the agent act in the principal's best interests at all
times.2 °2 The agent owes an ethical and legal duty, similar to that
involved in a fiduciary relationship, to act on behalf of the principal." 3
The agency relationship is based on an agreement between the agent
and principal. 2 4 Agency also requires that the agent be under the
control of the principal.0 5
At least one court has concluded that although a physician may freely
choose to belong to a multidisciplinary child abuse team, that choice does
not mean the physician has established an agency relationship with

Id. at 2274 n.2.
199. See, e.g., People v. Vigil, 104 P.3d 258, 265 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004), rev'd, 127 P.3d
916 (Colo. 2006); Commonwealth v. DeOliveira, 849 N.E.2d 218, 222-24 (Mass. 2006).
200. See, e.g., United States v. Ureta, 41 M.J. 571, 576-77 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 1994),
aft'd, 44 M.J. 290 (C.A.A.F. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1059 (1997) (explaining that
physician's and victim's knowledge that statements could be used for forensic and medical
purposes does not make the statements inadmissible); DeOliveira, 849 N.E.2d at 225
(holding that when police were not present at examination and did not instruct doctor on
how to do the examination, statements to doctor were not testimonial even when doctor
had talked to police and knew the statements could be used in a later criminal proceeding);
State v. Scacchetti, 711 N.W.2d 508, 515 (Minn. 2006) ("[Tlhe mere fact that Edinburgh
may be called to testify in court regarding sexual abuse cases does not transform the
medical purpose of the assessments into a prosecutorial purpose . . . ."); see also State v.
Bobadilla, 709 N.W.2d 243, 254 (Minn. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 382 (2006) (explaining
that when declarant or child protection worker is not acting in a substantial degree to
produce a statement for trial, statements are nontestimonial). Children know that they
go to the doctor for a medical purpose and to get medical care. See, e.g., In re T.T., 815
N.E.2d 789 (111. App. Ct. 2004).
201. See, e.g., HAROLD G. REUSCHLEIN & WILLIAM A. GREGORY, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW
OF AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP 3 (1979); WARREN A. SEAVEY, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF
AGENCY 2 (1964).
202. See REUSCHLEIN & GREGORY, supra note 201, at 10-11.
203. See id. at 3.
204. See, e.g., SEAVEY, supra note 201, at 3.
205. Id.
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police. °6 Merely being a member of an interdisciplinary team does not
result in a physician operating under the control of law enforcement.
Likewise, the physician has no agreement with police that the physician
will act as an agent of the police when police bring a patient to the
hospital. Doing an act that benefits someone does not, by itself,
establish an agency relationship. Arguably, it benefits law enforcement
when the physician records what the patient tells him or her. Even if
the physician believes that the statements could be used in a later
criminal prosecution and that the statements might benefit law
enforcement, that belief does not show that the physician's actions are
being controlled
by law enforcement. An agency relationship requires
207
more.

A physician's obligation is always to look after the best interests of the
patient: "A physician shall, while caring for a patient, regard responsibility to the patient as paramount." 2" From the time of Hippocrates,
physicians have taken a solen oath to act in the best interests of the
patient.20 9 Even in the modern era, the ethics of the Hippocratic Oath
are considered binding: "To the Hippocratic physician, nothing and no
one was more important than the patient; this has always been a
guiding principle of clinical medicine. Other patients, future patients,
and the rest of mankind have been secondary considerations when a
doctor is making decisions at the bedside of the sick."210 Physicians
who fail in their duty to always act in the patient's best interests are
subject to disciplinary actions and can even lose their license to practice
medicine.211

206. See, e.g., People v. Vigil, 127 P.3d 916 (Colo. 2006) (holding that a physician's
membership in a child protection team, absent direct and controlling police presence, does
not make a physician an agent of police).
207. See REUSCHLEIN & GREGORY, supra note 201, at 23. Physicians will document
what the patient tells them, whether the physician is a member of an interdisciplinary
team or not, and regardless of who brings the child to the physician. Physicians are
trained to always document whenever they take patient history because it is part of
providing medical care and because it is in the patient's best interests to do so.
208. AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION PRINCIPLES
OF MEDICAL ETHICS VIII (2001), available at http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/category/
2512.html (last visited Mar. 15, 2007).
209. See SHERWIN B. NuLAND, DOCTORS: THE BIOGRAPHY OF MEDICINE 26 (1995). As
the Hippocratic Oath states: "I will follow that system of regimen which, according to my
ability and judgment, I consider for the benefit of my patients, and abstain from whatever
is deleterious and mischievous." Id.
210. Id. at 487.
211. See Kara M. McCarthy, Doing Time for Clinical Crime: The Prosecution of
Incompetent Physiciansas an Additional Mechanism to Assure Quality Health Services, 28
SETON HALL L. REv. 569, 583-86 (1997).
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The physician's primary duty to always act on behalf of the patient's
best interests prevents a physician from acting as an agent of law
enforcement or the government. Agency requires an agreement or
contract between parties, and no such agreement exists between
physicians and law enforcement. The physician cannot release matters
considered part of the physician-patient privilege without the patient's
consent. 212 The physician is bound both ethically and legally to act in
the best interests of the patient-not law enforcement.
Additional rationales establish that physicians are not agents of law
enforcement. Law enforcement does not pay physicians' salaries.
Usually, physicians' salaries do not come from any governmental entity
21
Physibut are paid for by private health insurance organizations.

212. Only two exceptions exist to the physician-patient privilege.
Although a
mandatory reporter statute or court order may require a physician to disclose very specific
information, the physician-patient privilege still remains and does not allow public release
but only limited release to the agency referred to in the statute or to the court, which is
usually only for in camera review. Both the court and the agency act to preserve patient
confidentiality as much as possible. For a further analysis of mandatory reporter laws, see
infra notes 218-20 and accompanying text.
213. See RoY PORTER, THE GREATEST BENEFIT TO MANKIND: A MEDICAL HISTORY OF
HUMANITY 656-63 (1997). Even when a patient's physician's fees are paid by the
government, i.e., Medicare, acting on behalf of the patient does not cause that physician
to be an agent of law enforcement. Receiving a government salary does not make a
physician an agent of law enforcement because receiving a salary does not in itself result
in an agency relationship. Cf Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1 (1995) (explaining that error
by court clerk resulting in an arrest when warrant had been quashed should not result in
suppression when police acted on the information); People v. Scott, 117 Cal. Rptr. 925 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1974) (holding that exclusionary rule was not applicable when publicly employed
airport manager observed marijuana while looking in a car, even though he enforced safety
regulations but actual law enforcement and criminal investigations were left to police);
State v. Smith, 763 P.2d 632 (Kan. 1988) (explaining that items found by publicly employed
garbage collector should not be suppressed because there is no law enforcement action);
Commonwealth v. Ira I., 791 N.E.2d 894 (Mass. 2003) (holding that school officials acting
within the scope of their employment and not as instruments of the police are not required
to give Miranda warnings prior to questioning a student during a school investigation);
Commonwealth v. Allen, 480 N.E.2d 630 (Mass. 1985) (explaining that nurse talking with
hospitalized arrestee does not require Miranda warnings); Commonwealth v. Cote, 444
N.E.2d 1282 (Mass. App. Ct. 1983) (holding that meter reader employed by municipally
owned public utility is not law enforcement and suppression not appropriate); State v.
Tinkham, 719 A.2d 580 (N.H. 1998) (holding that the fact a principal intended to turn over
evidence of criminal conduct to police or told police she was going to question a student
does not make the teacher an agent of police); Utah ex. rel. A.R. v. C.R., 982 P.2d 73 (Utah
1999) (stating that the exclusionary rule does not apply to child protection proceedings
because the primary focus is to protect abused children and punishment of the parents is
not the purpose of the proceeding).

2007]

CRAWFORD V. WASHINGTON

619

cians are not usually trained in forensic interviewing.214 In a large
number of cases, physicians do not diagnose child sexual abuse but have
"undetermined" findings.215 Physicians use objective guidelines for
diagnosing whether a child has been sexually abused. 21" The use of
objective guidelines and the large number of cases with "inconclusive"
findings shows that physicians are not acting to assist law enforcement
but are attempting to make a medical diagnosis and provide medical
care.
The agency relationship requires that the principal have the ability to
control the actions of the agent; however, physicians are not under the
control of law enforcement.1 7 Agency also requires that the principal
be liable for the actions of his agent; however, law enforcement is not

214. One commonly-used text used to teach health care providers about taking patient
history and examinations has only one page and a half, out of a total of 862 pages,
specifically describing how to talk with children. See LYNN S. BICKLEY & PETER G.
SZILAGYI, BATES' GUIDE TO PHYSICAL EXAMINATION AND HISTORY TAKING 52-53 (8th ed.
2003).
215. For example, data from one medical organization show that a diagnosis of "not
abuse" or "inconclusive" is made in approximately fifty percent of all cases. Letter from
Dr. Mark Hudson, Midwest Children's Resource Center, Children's Hospitals and Clinics
of Minnesota to author (December 4th, 2006) (letter on file with author) (letter covers from
March 2005 through March 2006).
216. See generally Nancy Kellogg, M.D., American Academy of Pediatrics Clinical
Report: The Evaluation of Sexual Abuse in Children, 116 PEDIATRICS No. 2, 506 (2005)
(studying the objective guidelines for determining whether abuse occurred).
217. See DeOliveira, 849 N.E.2d at 225.
Patricia's statements cannot persuasively be said to have been made in response
to police interrogation. Although police officers were present at the hospital, there
is no indication in the record that they were present during the doctor's
examination of Patricia, or that they had instructed the doctor on the manner in
which his examination should proceed. Nothing in the record would support a
determination that the doctor acted as an agent of law enforcement. Indeed, the
doctor's testimony as to his role as a physician entirely independent from law
enforcement, and the judge's findings in connection with his medical evaluation
of Patricia, are all to the contrary.
Id.
Although the examination and the medical report may have investigative value,
the clinician must make it clear to child protection and law enforcement that the
purpose for examining a child suspected of being abused is to diagnose and treat
any residual consequences of the alleged sexual contact that may be found.
Martin A. Finkel, Documentation and Report Formulation:The Backbone of the Medical
Record, in ANGELO P. GIARDINO, ELIZABETH M. DATNER & JANICE B. ASHER, SEXUAL
ASSAULT: VICTIMIZATION ACROSS THE LIFESPAN-A CLINICAL GUIDE 189, 190 (2003). If law
enforcement officers are present when a doctor wishes to speak to a patient who has been
sexually assaulted, "[law enforcement officers should be excused from the room." ROBERT
E. RAKEL, TEXTBOOK OF FAMILY PRACTICE 83 (6th ed. 2002).
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liable for the actions of physicians. Doctors cannot ethically be agents
of law enforcement and always act in the patient's best interests.
Physicians' obligations as mandated reporters of child abuse under
state statutes do not result in physicians acting as agents of law
enforcement.2 18 When acting as mandated reporters, physicians do not
freely enter into an agency relationship by simply reporting abuse as
they are required to do by law. Making a report is also not a voluntary
act because it is required by statute. Mandatory reporter statutes do not
create an agency relationship because agency requires more than a
communication about the existence of possible abuse. The mandatory
reporter statutes do not relieve physicians of their ethical obligations or
change the physician-patient relationship. Following the mandatory
reporter statute is also acting in the patient's best medical interests. A
physician has a duty to make sure that an abused child does not go back
into a situation where the child's health or life may be endangered.219
Physicians report because it is in their patients' best interests to do so.
Physicians are neither members nor agents of law enforcement. The
Crawford-Davisrequirement for a statement to be considered testimonial-that the statements be made to law enforcement-is therefore not
met when a victim of child abuse is taken to a physician for evaluation
and diagnosis.2 2 °

218. Professor Robert Mosteller argues mandated reporter statutes make physicians
agents of law enforcement. See Robert P. Mosteller, Crawford v. Washington: Encouraging
and Ensuring the Confrontation of Witnesses, 39 U. RICH. L. REV. 511, 574 (2005); see also
Friedman, supranote 79, at 263 (2005) (stating that "perhaps" a doctor mandated to report
should be considered a government agent).
219. See, e.g., United States v. Renville, 779 F.2d 430, 438 & n.13 (8th Cir. 1985)
(holding that physicians have a legal duty to prevent abuse reoccurrence); State v.
Robinson, 735 P.2d 801,810 (Ariz. 1987) (explaining that effective treatment and diagnosis
may require that the victim avoid contact with the abuser to avoid future abuse and ensure
recovery from past abuse). Because the physical and emotional trauma of abuse can be a
recurrent pattern, physicians must attempt to identify the abuser in order to provide the
medical treatment of avoiding further abuse. See also Marilyn J. Maag, A Child's
Statements Naming An Abuser Are Admissible Under the MedicalDiagnosis or Treatment
Exception to the Hearsay Rule, 53 U. CIN. L. REV. 1155, 1168 (1984).
220. Nor does Crawford's stated rationale of deterring law enforcement misconduct
apply to statements taken by physicians. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52-53, 67-68; see also
e.g., People v. Geno, 683 N.W.2d 687, 691-92 (Mich. Ct. App. 2004) (holding children's
response to non-governmental interviewer not testimonial); see generallyMYERS, supra note
7, § 7.22, at 638 n.637.
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B. The Definition of Testimonial Statement Should Require That It
Be a Formal Statement Taken by Law Enforcement or Agents of Law
Enforcement
The reasoning in Crawford regarding testimonial statements analysis
appears to be based on arguments and writings of several leading legal
academics.22 ' Many insightful arguments have been made that
Confrontation Clause analysis had become too convoluted and complicated in the pre-Crawford era.222 Several of these arguments regarding
the proper definition of a testimonial statement, however, are misplaced
and should not be adopted by the Court. 2" All of these arguments are
relevant in analyzing whether statements under the medical exception
should be considered testimonial. A statement should be considered
testimonial only when it is a formal statement taken by law enforcement
or agents of law enforcement.224
In determining whether a statement is testimonial, one commentator
has argued that "the bottom line question is what the witness anticipated."225 This standard, however, based solely on what a witness
anticipated, without also requiring that the statement be taken by law

See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 60-61 (citing AKHIL AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND
Richard D. Friedman, supra note 98).
222. See, e.g., Richard D. Friedman, The Confrontation Clause Re-Rooted and
Transformed, 2004 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 439, 448-50, available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/
scr/2004/confrontationclause.pdf (last visited Mar. 15, 2007). In addition to the articles
cited here, Professor Friedman has written many others on Confrontation Clause analysis.
See, e.g., Richard D. Friedman, Confrontation Rights of Criminal Defendants, in

221.

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 125-31 (1997);

PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIRST WORLD CONFERENCE ON NEW TRENDS IN CRIMINAL
INVESTIGATION AND EVIDENCE 533, 533-41 (J.F. Nijboer & J.M. Reijntjes eds., 1997);

Richard D. Friedman, Lilly v. Virginia: Glimmers of Hope for the Confrontation Clause?,
INT'L COMMENTARY ON EVIDENCE, July 10, 2000, available at http://www.bepress.com/ice/
voll/iss2/art6/ (last visited Mar. 15, 2007); Richard D. Friedman, Remote Testimony, 35 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 695 (2002); Richard D. Friedman, Thoughts From Across the Water on
Hearsay and Confrontation, 1998 CRIM. L. REV. 697; Richard D. Friedman, Truth and Its
Rivals in the Law of Hearsay and Confrontation, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 545 (1998).
223. Because the Court has held that testimonial analysis is the law of the land, this
Article will limit itself to discussing how "testimonial" should be defined with reference to
the medical exception. Whether testimonial analysis based on an originalist methodology
is the best approach for Confrontation Clause analysis of interpreting when confrontation
exceptions should apply is another issue.
224. See Friedman, supra note 79, at 259-63, for arguments that government
involvement should not be necessary for a statement to be considered testimonial. See
notes 90-101 supra and accompanying text for a further analysis of this argument.
225. Friedman, supra note 79, at 262.
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enforcement or its agent, is too vague to be practical.226 Often the
victim or witness of an act is unable to anticipate that this act will
result in criminal charges. For example, in cases involving "date rape,"
"statutory rape," incest cases, cases with mentally-impaired victims,
asleep or unconscious victims, and young child victims, the victim is
often in shock and unsure if the behavior is criminal. It may take some
time for the victim to comprehend that she has been raped.22 7 Prosecutors do not always agree on which behaviors or cases should result in
criminal charges or criminal prosecution, and it is unrealistic to think
members of the general public should be able to do so, especially before
law enforcement has become involved. Use of an "anticipatory test,"
without the requirement of the involvement of law enforcement or its
agents, is no less vague than the reliability standard criticized in
Crawford.
In determining whether a statement should be considered testimonial,
it is appropriate to consider, as one factor, what a witness anticipates
about the statement. However, the witness's anticipation that the acts
could be used in a later prosecution, or that the behavior could be
criminal, should not be sufficient in itself to make the statement
testimonial. 22' This position is supported by the existence of the co-

226. Professor Friedman has argued for a testimonial test, in part because he states
it would prevent overbroad application of the Confrontation Clause. See Friedman, supra
note 98, at 1030-32; Richard D. Friedman, Confrontation and the Definition of Chutzpa, 31
ISRAEL L. REV. 506, 512-14 (1997).
227. See generally ROBIN WARSHAW, I NEVER CALLED IT RAPE (1988). Throughout
history, members of the public have disagreed about which behaviors should be considered
rape and what degree of proof should be required for an accusation to be considered true.
See, e.g., SUSAN EsTRicH, REAL RAPE 28, 42-46 (1987) (stating that women's allegations of
rape were regarded as inherently suspicious and the allegation had to be corroborated;
jurors could not convict on the testimony of a woman alone); Barbara S. Lindemann, "To
Ravish and CarnallyKnow": Rape in Eighteenth.Century Massachusetts, 10 SIGNS 63, 79
(1984) (stating that women were taught from childhood to defer to men, and usually the
only cases reported and prosecuted were those where the community acknowledged a
sexual attack had taken place).
228. Professor Friedman argues otherwise: "Ifa statement is made in circumstances
in which a reasonable person would realize that it likely would be used in an investigation
or prosecution of a crime, then the statement should be deemed testimonial." Richard D.
Friedman & Bridget McCormack, Dial-In Testimony, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1171, 1240-41
(2002). Selling cocaine is illegal, but as Friedman rightfully argues, if the suspect does not
know an undercover agent is involved, then any statements made to the undercover agent
should be considered nontestimonial. As the cocaine example illustrates, however,
Friedman's positions are contradictory. Believing the behavior is criminal, e.g., selling
cocaine, does not make the statement testimonial if it is made to an undercover agent. But
Friedman also argues that if the statements are made when a person believes the
statements could be used to investigate a crime, or in the prosecution of a crime, then that
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conspirator exception. 229 By the time of the Founders' era, it was well
established that the statements of coconspirators that were made in
furtherance of the conspiracy were an exception to confrontation.3 ° If
the Founders had believed that it was enough to make statements
inadmissible if the individual anticipated that statements could be used
in an investigation or that the behavior was criminal, the Founders
would never have allowed use of the coconspirator exception. Similarly,
even if a physician, law enforcement, or the child believes that the
child's statements to the physician could be used in an investigation or
later prosecution, that alone does not make the child's statements
testimonial.
Davis v. Washington also indicates that the Court does not consider
the declarant's knowledge of the possibility of an investigation, or of the
criminality of the behavior, to be, in itself, controlling. The declarant in
Davis knew she was the victim of a crime, an assault,23 ' but that
knowledge did not make her call during an ongoing emergency testimonial.232 Her primary purpose in making the call was to get help.2 3

alone should make the statements testimonial. This, of course, contradicts his position that
statements to an undercover agent are nontestimonial. Most persons know selling cocaine
is criminal, and thus, by inference most persons know that any time one engages in
criminal behavior one could be prosecuted in court; yet, that should not result in the statements being considered testimonial. Coconspirators almost always know which behavior
is criminal; the behavior is part of a conspiracy because the conspirators do not want the
criminal behavior to become public. Even though conspirators know the behavior is
criminal, or could result in an investigation, the Founders accepted the use of the
coconspirator's statements as an exception to confrontation. Based on Crawford's
originalist methodology, Friedman's argument is unconvincing.
229. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 56.
230. See id.; WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., CRIMINAL LAW § 6.4, at 525
(2d ed. 1986) (stating that the crime of conspiracy is an ancient one). The admissibility of
coconspirator statements was "purely [a question] of criminal law, or of conspiracy as
affecting joint civil liability, and its solution is not to be sought in any principle of Evidence." 4 WIGMORE, supra note 126, § 1079, at 130-31. The Founders' generation did not
use the rationale that coconspirator statements were nontestimonial and an exception to
confrontation because the declarant did not know he was speaking to law enforcement; they
held the statements to be admissible because the defendant was in privity with the
coconspirator, and thus joint liability was appropriate. See, e.g., Guy v. Hall, 7 N.C. (3
Mur.) 150, 151-52 (1819) (indicating that statements made by agents may be used against
those in privity with those agents).
231. See Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2271 (quoting the victim telling the dispatcher, 'He's here
jumpin' on me again," and when asked if the defendant had a weapon, the victim replied:
"No. He's usin' his fists.").
232. Id. at 2277.
233. Id. at 2271, 2277.
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Language about casual statements not being considered testimonial in
concurring opinions in Lily v. Virginia24 and White v. Illinois2 3 ' also

supports the view that mere knowledge that the behavior is criminal
should not result in statements being viewed as testimonial."8
Arguments that casual statements should be considered testimonial
are especially unpersuasive when young children are witnesses or
victims.

237

Young children often do not even know a crime has been

committed when they are assaulted.2 38 One commentator has argued

234. 527 U.S. 116, 140-43 (1999) (Breyer, J., concurring).
235. 502 U.S. 346, 358-66 (1992) (Thomas & Scalia, JJ., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment).
236. Clearly, statements made to private persons, such as family or friends, even if
about behaviors that could be considered criminal, should not be considered testimonial.
Even if the statements are about criminal behaviors, most reasonable persons would
believe that statements made to private persons, such as family or friends, are casual. In
White, Justice Thomas went further and correctly suggested that in some situations, even
casual statements to police should not be considered testimonial. See id. at 364.
Attempts to draw a line between statements made in contemplation of legal
proceedings and those not so made would entangle the courts in a multitude of
difficulties. Few types of statements could be categorically characterized as within
or without the reach of a defendant's confrontation rights. Not even statements
made to the police or government officials could be deemed automatically subject
to the right of confrontation (imagine a victim who blurts out an accusation to a
passing police officer, or the unsuspecting social-services worker who is told of
possible child abuse).
Id. In his Davis opinion, concurring in part and dissenting in part, Justice Thomas
highlighted some of the difficulties with the Court's reasoning. See Davis, 126 S. Ct. at
2283 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (indicating
that the Court's decision results in an indiscernible hierarchy of purpose that actually
examines the function of the statement when police usually have indiscernible multiple
purposes for asking questions).
237. See DeOliveira, 849 N.E.2d at 225 ("Logic informs that a six year old child can
have little or no comprehension of a criminal prosecution in which the child's words might
be introduced as evidence . . ").
238. See id. at 226. ("On this record, there is nothing to indicate that Patricia even
recognized the criminality of the defendant's sexual contacts with her.") Professor
Friedman himself acknowledges that very young children often do not know a statement
could be used in court:
It is tempting to conclude without analysis that, given that the child is a human,
she should be treated as a witness, like adult humans or older children who make
statements alleging criminal conduct .... Suppose a child is so young that she has
no sense that what she is reporting is wrongful conduct ....
It seems dubious to
say that the children in these cases were acting as witnesses ....
Certainly these
children are providing information, but people do that all the time--completing
business records, advancing conspiracies, and so forth-without the communication being testimonial.
Friedman, supra note 99, at 250; see Allie Phillips, A Ray of Hope in the Wake of Crawford
v. Washington: An Analysis of Bobadilla v. Minnesota, Part 2 of 2, UPDATE, vol. 18, No. 12
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for an even more amorphous standard for young children. He argues
that for these victims, the statement should be considered testimonial if
the child could know "that she was reporting wrongdoing and that some
adverse consequences-including that Mommy would get mad-would
be visited on the wrongdoer."2 39 This proposed standard is even more
vague and overly broad than the "anticipatory test" discussed above.
For young children, many behaviors exist that could be considered
wrongful but would not result in a case going to court-for example,
fighting with a sibling. For a child, adverse consequences visited on the
wrongdoer could include a "time out," having to go to bed early, or
simply having to apologize. Such a vague standard would result in an
overbroad application of which statements should be considered to be
testimonial. If statements are testimonial based on a child anticipating
Mommy could get mad, the number of testimonial statements would be
boundless-almost any statement any child makes could be considered
testimonial.
C. The Medical Exception Applies Even Without Treatment and
Diagnosis
Use of the medical exception has been criticized when it results in the
admission of statements given to the physician for purposes of diagnosis
when the declarant has no belief she will receive treatment. 240 The
criticism is that such statements are simply taken to gather evidence
and do not have the degree of trustworthiness
that is necessary for a
241
confrontation exception to properly exist.

This criticism is based on a misplaced premise about medical
examinations and the importance of patient history. Physicians are
taught that taking patient history is one of the important parts of any
examination and spend a considerable amount of time learning how to
do so effectively.242 Patient history is considered the most likely
portion of an examination to provide a diagnosis.24 Often the patient's

(2006), available at http://www.ndaa.org/publications/newsletters/update-vol_18-number
12_2006.pdf (last visited Mar. 15, 2007) (providing a list of cases that have held that
young children do not understand that their statements could be used at trial); Allie
Phillips, Child Forensic Interviews after Crawford v. Washington: Testimonial or Not?, 39
THE PROSECUTOR 17 (July/August 2005) (discussing the psychological literature indicating
that young children do not understand their statements could be used in court).
239. Friedman, supra note 79, at 273.
240. See Mosteller, supra note 218, at 601.
241. Id. at 602.
242. See, e.g., BICKLEY & SzILAGY1, supra note 214, at 1-57, 79.
243. One study shows that in 80% of all medical cases the final diagnosis is evident
from the patient history alone. See RAKEL, supra note 217, at 247.
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condition, such as the location of an ache, is only ascertainable by asking
the patient because the perception of the symptom is subjective. The
fact that the patient's complaint is based on a subjective feeling of pain
does not make the statement any less valid for use in medical diagnosis
and treatment.
This criticism also overemphasizes the role of physician treatment.
Many patients visit physicians for routine checkups or for preventive
care, instances during which no diagnosis of illness is made and no
treatment is given. 2 " Hippocrates urged physicians to often provide
no treatment, based on his dictum "primum non nocere" ("First, do no
harm"), as nature itself was considered the best healer.2 45 Physicians
often make a diagnosis but provide no treatment, or are unable to make
a diagnosis, and wait to see if the patient's condition resolves on its
own.246 Frequently, a physician will refer a patient to another physician for additional consultation when unsure of the diagnosis or what
treatment should be given. 4 ' In cases involving sexually assaulted
children, children are often examined to assure parents and the child
that no physical harm has occurred and that the child has not been
infected with a sexually transmitted disease. A finding of no physical
injuries is a medical diagnosis just as much as a finding of injuries. In
all of these cases, the medical exception still applies even if no treatment
is given or the patient has no expectation of treatment being given.
It is also claimed that if the child does not know he or she is seeing
the physician for medical and treatment purposes, then the exception
does not apply.24 However, it should be sufficient for the exception to
apply if the child is told he or she is seeing a doctor or going to a doctor's

244. See id. at 14. In order based on frequency, the seven most common principal
reasons for physician visits are: general medical examinations; progress visits, not
otherwise specified; cough; routine prenatal examinations; postoperative visits; symptoms
referable to throat; and well baby examinations. Id. Increasingly, physicians are stressing
preventive care, see id. at 183-211, and patient education as important aspects of medical
care although no diagnosis or treatment may be given, see id. at 253-62.
245. See NULAND, supra note 209, at 15-16 ("[Intervention is best kept minimal, if
indeed it is required at all.").
246. "The Hippocratic physician understood that the power which he called Nature is
a formative, constructive, and curative power; the human body tends to heal itself." Id. at
15.
247. Many Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs) and insurance plans require the
patient's "primary physician" to make a referral before the patient can consult with a
medical expert. In these cases the patient's problems are often not diagnosed by the
primary physician, and the patient has received no treatment.
248. See Mosteller, supra note 5, at 292-94.
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office.249 Very young children are familiar with going to the doctor to
get checkups, to be examined for sore throats or ear infections, and to
receive immunizations. As every parent and physician knows, very
young children often become scared on being told they are going to visit
the doctor; many children ask if they will be given shots. Children's
concerns about getting shots and about doctor visits indicate that even
very young children understand they go to the doctor for medical
purposes and for medical care. Since children understand they go to the
doctor for medical care it follows they understand the importance of
being truthful to the doctor.
Physicians are taught that good patient care requires them to
introduce themselves and explain to a child patient what the physician
is doing and why.210 Physicians are also taught that children as young
as three to four years old can participate verbally as well as physically
in their own healthcare, and that children can and will respond
relevantly to seriously-posed questions about themselves.25 ' Physicians tell the child patient, in effect, "We are taking care of you." The
critical factors are that a physician-patient relationship exists and that
the physician provides medical care-not whether a diagnosis or
treatment is provided. 5 2

249. See, e.g., In re Daniel W., 130 Cal. Reptr. 2d 412, 416 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003)
(indicating that the child was told that he was going to the hospital so the doctor would fix
it so it wouldn't hurt); In re T.T., 815 N.E.2d at 794, 803-04; State v. Larson, 472 N.W.2d
120, 126 (Minn. 1991) (stating that the child knew she was in a doctor's office for an exam).
Young children know they go to the doctor to get medical care and for a medical purpose.
250.
Children continually need to know what is happening and what is going to happen
to them in the immediate future. Their anxiety will be significantly reduced when
physicians take time to explain what they are doing, what they are going to do,
and, when they engage the child as an active participant, as much as the clinical
situation and good judgment will allow.
William H. Hetznecker* Marc A. Formen & Jorge H. Daruna, Psychologic Disorders:The
Clinical Interview (History), in NELSON TEXTBOOK OF PEDIATRICS 66, 67 (Robert E.
Behrman, Robert M. Kliegman, & Hal B. Jenson eds., 16th ed. 2000). "Initial or casual
encounters with young children are often made easier when introduced in a whisper.
Id.
251. Id. ("When children are old enough, at 4-5 yr, form the habit of discussing with
them their symptoms, diagnoses, and treatments in terms they can understand.").
252. See MYERS, supra note 7, § 7.15[D][7] (providing a thorough review of cases that
address this subject).
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D. Videotaping Statements to PhysiciansDoes Not Constitute
ManufacturingEvidence
Another contention is that the use of videotaping "to record hearsay
highlights a critical feature that demands special treatment-the use of
a hearsay exception in a purposeful effort to manufacture evidence."252
It is acknowledged that some videotapes can be used for therapeutic
purposes but that there are cases where they are not used for diagnostic
or therapeutic purposes and are not the byproduct of substantive medical
activity.254
Critics argue such medical videotapes "should not be
treated qualitatively differently than those made exclusively for
prosecutorial purposes."2 5
Recording a child's statement on videotape is simply a different
method of memorializing the child's statements. The only difference
between a physician's handwritten notes and videotaping is that
videotaping allows the child's demeanor to be recorded on videotape, as
well as the exact questions the child is asked. But the physician could
record his or her observations of the child's demeanor in the medical

253. See Robert P. Mosteller, Remaking Confrontation Clause and Hearsay Doctrine
Under the Challenge of Child Sexual Abuse Prosecutions, 1993 U. ILL. L. REV. 691, 775
(1993).
254. Id. at 775-76. Medical and therapeutic purposes, however, justify the use of
videotapes whenever children who have been possibly abused are interviewed by medical
professionals. See, e.g., State v. Bobadilla, 709 N.W.2d 243, 255 (Minn. 2006), cert. denied,
127 S. Ct. 382 (2006) ("Given the clear need to limit a child's exposure to stressful and
confusing interviews, and the accompanying need to accurately assess risks to the child,
there is a compelling need for a single recorded assessment interview solely in order to best
protect the health and welfare of the child.").
255. Mosteller, supra note 253, at 775-76. Professor Mosteller claims that the
prosecutorial and medical purposes are intermingled, that the mandatory reporter laws
turn medical interviews into statements for the prosecutorial function, that questions about
the identity of the perpetrator are not different from questions police ask, and that because
many of these interviews are conducted by "trauma teams," this results in the interviewers
being functionally part of the prosecutorial team. Id. at 776. The mandatory reporter and
identity of the perpetrator issues have been addressed elsewhere in this Article. See supra
notes 218-20 and accompanying text. Arguments based on the physician's belonging to an
interdisciplinary or "trauma" team is addressed at supra notes 206-07. The intermingled
purpose argument is addressed at supra notes 197-219 and accompanying text. Assuming
arguendo that there is a mixed purpose when a physician or nurse practitioner asks a
patient questions, under Davis, the statements are not testimonial if the primary purpose
is not to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.
See Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2276-78. Medical videotapes used by physicians and nurses are
different than other videotapes because physicians do not make such videotapes
"exclusively for prosecutorial purposes." It must be acknowledged that Davis had not been
decided at the time Professor Mosteller made his "mixed purpose" arguments.
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notes. If the physician wishes, she or he can record in the handwritten
notes the exact words she or he uses in asking questions. The manner
of recording medical statements should not result in a different
constitutional analysis. Medical records are made in as accurate a
fashion as possible; videotaping the statements to make their memorialization even more accurate should not render the statements testimonial.
A physician's decision to record a patient's statements on videotape or
in writing is not "manufacturing" evidence. The word "manufacture" can
be defined as to "invent or fabricate." 256 A physician does not invent
or fabricate what a child states but simply accurately records it. If the
physician told the child what to say or purposefully altered a videotape
so it did not accurately record what the patient told the doctor, then it
could be said that the physician manufactured evidence. Ironically,
when a doctor tries to use what is perhaps the best method of memorialization of the child's statements-videotaping-it is argued that this
memorialization is manufacturing evidence.
Nor should use of videotaping be considered to create such a level of
formality for the statement as to render it testimonial. In Davis the 911
call was audiotaped; that level of formality is similar to that of
videotaping. The only difference is that the videotape records a patient's
demeanor in addition to the patient's statements. The Court in Davis
ruled that the audiotaped 911 call was not testimonial.25 7 Videotaped
statements should also be considered nontestimonial because their level
of formality is similar to that of audiotapes. Nor should the level of
formality, in and of itself, render a statement testimonial. As Crawford
and Davis indicate, testimonial analysis requires the weighing of several
factors.
E. The Medical Exception Should Apply to Statements Made to NonPhysicianMedical Professionals
The medical exception also applies to statements made to other
medical personnel who provide health care, such as phlebotomists, x-ray
technicians, paramedics, social workers, and nurses.2 58 Statements

256. See THE NEW OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY 1042 (2001). Another definition of
"manufacture" is to "make (something) on a large scale using machinery." Id. Using this
definition is also inaccurate. The physician records the statement, and if the physician
does so accurately, it is the patient who makes the statement. To assert that accurately
recording a witness statement is making evidence is a distortion of what is occurring when
the physician records statements made by patients.
257. Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2277.
258. See, e.g., State v. Saunders, 132 P.3d 743,748-49 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006) (indicating
that statements to paramedics are nontestimonial and admissible under medical exception);
see also MCCORMICK, supra note 122, § 277, at 235 (indicating the statement need not have
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made to Sexual Assault Nurse Examiners ("SANE"), Sexual Assault
Response Team ("SART") members, and other forensic nurses should be
considered nontestimonial for the same reasons that statements to
physicians are considered nontestomonial. 2 9 A SANE's primary
purpose is to provide medical care for his or her patient, who has been
the victim of sexual or other abuse.260 Admittedly, part of the SANE's
role is also to gather evidence of sexual assault or injuries to the patient.
However, sexual assault is a medical diagnosis,26 ' and medical care is
given based on that diagnosis. Gathering evidence for purposes of
making that medical diagnosis should not result in the patient's
statements being considered testimonial merely because the statements
could be used in a later criminal prosecution.26 2

been made to a physician; it can be made to others, such as ambulance drivers, family
members, psychologists, social workers, etc., as long as it is made in order to receive
medical care).
259. See supra notes 197-252 and accompanying text.
260. See, e.g., OREGON STATE BOARD OF NURSING, REGISTERED NURSE SCOPE OF
PRACTICE AS A SEXUAL ASSAULT NURSE EXAMINER OF PEDIATRIC PATIENTS POLICY
STATEMENT, available at http://oregon.gov/OSBN/pdfs/policies/Sane.pdf (last visited Mar.
15, 2007) (indicating it is within the nurse's scope of practice for the nurse practitioner to
initiate prophylactic treatment, including treatment for sexually transmitted diseases or
for possible pregnancy and to make findings on whether a diagnosis of sexual abuse can
be made); INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF FORENSIC NURSES (IAFN), PEDIATRIC
EDUCATIONAL GUIDELINES FOR SEXUAL ASSAULT NURSE EXAMINERS, (indicating that it is
within the SANE nurse's protocol and clinical skills to provide "evaluation and treatment
for pediatric sexual assault/abuse patients," including treatment for sexually transmitted
diseases and pregnancy and assessment of trauma and interventions for that trauma).
261. See, e.g., Griffen v. State, 243 Ga. App. 282, 285-86, 531 S.E.2d 175, 180 (2000)
(stating that SANE with over 20 years experience in obstetrics and gynecology, specialized
training in examining victims of sexual assault, and 100 previous examinations was
qualified to render medical opinions as an expert in the field of sexual assault examinations); Chevez v. State, No. 05-98-01904-CR., 2000 WL 1618459, at *2-*3 (Tex. Crim. App.
Oct. 31, 2000) (holding that SANE was allowed to give medical opinion regarding causation
of hymenal condition when SANE took a 48-hour course over three weekends on sexual
assault, performed three supervised examinations, conducted 20 independent examinations,
and periodically met with other nurses and doctors to review cases).
262. See, e.g., Foley v. State, 914 So. 2d 677, 683-85 (Miss. 2005) (holding that a fiveyear-old's statement to a physician was nontestimonial); State v. Fisher, 108 P.3d 1262,
1269 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005) (holding that 29 month old's statement to pediatrician was
nontestimonial); Griner v. State, 899 A.2d 189, 205-08 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2006) (stating
that four year old's statements to pediatric nurse was nontestimonial); State v. Lee, No.
22262, 2005 WL 544837 (Ohio Ct. App. March 9, 2005) (indicating that statements to
sexual assault nurse are nontestimonial and thus admissible when victim first went to
police, but then during treatment, no officers accompanied her and were not present during
the examination); State v. Stahl, 855 N.E.2d 834, 836-46 (Ohio 2006) (statements to
forensic violent-emergencies nurse are nontestimonial, even when police took the victim
to the hospital and the police were present during the statement, because police are not
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In Davis the Court held that even if 911 dispatchers are considered to
be the police, statements made to the dispatchers are not testimonial if
the circumstances objectively indicate that the primary purpose involved
is to obtain assistance during an ongoing emergency.263 Similarly,
even if any statements made to the SANE could be used in a later
prosecution, where the circumstances objectively indicate that the
primary purpose of the SANE's questioning is for medical care, the
statements should be deemed nontestimonial. SANEs cannot act as
agents of law enforcement because the SANE's duty is always to act in
the best interests of the patient.2
F

Medical Statements Are Nontestimonial

To be admissible after Crawford, medical exception statements must
be found to be nontestimonial. Crawford and Davis provide support for
considering medical exception statements to be nontestimonial.2 65 In
order for statements to be deemed testimonial, Crawford and Davis
require that the statements be such that a reasonable person would

allowed to ask questions during the exam); Commonwealth v. Brown, No. 3082-05-01, 2006
Va. App. LEXIS 152, at *10 (Va. Ct. App. April 20, 2006) (indicating that statement to
SANE was admissible as nontestimonial because it was made in a non-adversarial setting).
But see State v. Krasky, 721 N.W.2d 916, 922-923 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006), rev. granted2006
Minn. Lexis 901 (Minn. Dec. 20, 2006) (indicating that SANE nurse interview of six year
old was testimonial when the nurse acted "in concert" with police investigation, the
suspected abuse happened two years previously, and parental rights of the alleged
perpetrator were terminated); Medina v. State, 131 P.3d 15, 20-21 (Nev. 2006) (SANE
nurse is acting as a police agent or operative because she testified that she is a "forensic
nurse" and because she gathers evidence for the prosecution for later use in criminal
prosecutions); State v. Romero, 133 P.3d 842, 858-60 (N.M. Ct. App. 2006), cert. granted,
134 P.3d 120 (N.M. Apr. 10, 2006) (indicating that when three weeks elapsed between the
incident and examination and because police made medical appointment for victim a
reasonable person would know statements made to SANE could be used later in court even
if victim was seeking, in part, medical treatment).
263. Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2276-77.
264. The Hippocratic Oath and other medical ethics rules apply to nurses as well as
physicians because nurses are considered agents of physicians when providing medical care
under a physician's supervision.
265. See, e.g., United States v. Peneaux, 432 F.3d 882, 895-96 (8th Cir. 2005) (stating
that Crawford analysis supports medical statements being considered nontestimonial);
United States v. Kappell, 418 F.3d 550 (6th Cir. 2005); see also Exparte C.L.Y., 928 So. 2d
1069 (Ala. 2005); People v. Cage, 15 Cal. Rptr. 3d 846 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004); Douglas v.
State, 913 So. 2d 1234 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005); People v. West, 823 N.E.2d 82 (Ill. App.
Ct. 2005); Griner v. State, 899 A.2d 189 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2006); Commonwealth v.
DeOliveira, 849 N.E.2d 218 (Mass. 2006); State v. Scacchetti, 711 N.W.2d 508 (Minn. 2006);
State v. Vaught, 682 N.W.2d 284 (Neb. 2004); State v. Lewis, 616 S.E. 2d 1 (N.C. Ct. App.
2005); State v. Fischer, 108 P.3d 1262 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005); see generally Mosteller, supra
note 218, at 600-08.
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objectively know from all the circumstances that the statements could
be used in a later criminal prosecution, are primarily made for that
purpose, and are made to someone in law enforcement.266 None of
these requirements is met when statements are made to medical
personnel.
Statements made by a patient to a physician are made in order for the
physician to make a medical diagnosis and sometimes-but not
necessarily-to obtain treatment. Because a reasonable person would
objectively know from the circumstances that statements made to a
physician are for medical purposes, and are private and confidential, a
reasonable person would normally not believe that the statements could
be used in court." 7
The decision to make public a statement made by a patient to a
physician, or to waive the medical privilege, belongs to the patient.26
Because of the medical privilege, the patient, not law enforcement,
decides whether statements will be made public. Clearly, a medical
doctor is not a law enforcement officer. Accordingly, patient statements
are not the kind of statements a reasonable person would objectively
know from the circumstances could be used in a later criminal prosecution; thus, they are not testimonial.
The Court in Crawford also implied that the statements made under
the medical exception may be considered nontestimonial. The Court in

266. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51-52; Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2273-74. In Davis, in
determining whether the statements made during a 911 call were testimonial, the Court
stated it would not attempt an exhaustive classification of all conceivable statements as
either testimonial or nontestimonial. Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2273-74. Davis further clarified
Crawford by indicating that the Court would consider whether the statements were made
"when the circumstances objectively indicate ... that the primary purpose of the
interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal
prosecution." Id. Davis stated that police interrogation, as opposed to the police merely
conversing with someone, is not always required for a statement to be considered
testimonial. See id. at 2274 n.1.
267. Health care providers must inform patients that patient statements to physicians
and other medical records are confidential. See Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act (HIPAA), 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.500, 520 (2002). The patient is also told the
privilege to waive confidentiality and privacy belongs to the patient, not the doctor. See
id. Most states have laws that also provide a medical privilege. See generally 1
MCCORMICK, supra note 122, §§ 98-105. A physician's obligation to preserve patient
confidentiality is also part of the Hippocratic Oath: "Whatever I see or hear, professionally
or privately, which ought not to be divulged, I will keep secret and tell no one." PORTER,
supra note 213, at 65. Accordingly, if a noncooperative witness declines to waive the
medical privilege, the statements would not be admissible under most states' statutes or
rules of evidence even though the statements are nontestimonial and thus admissible as
an exception to confrontation.
268. See generally 8 WIGMORE, supra note 126, § 2386.
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Crawford noted that admitting the statements to the police officer in
White v. Illinois2 69 resulted in that case being in tension with Crawford.27' The Court in Crawford did not, however, indicate that admitting statements made to the medical doctor and nurse in White was in
tension with Crawford.71 In White Justices Thomas and Scalia
concurred in part, concurred in the judgment, and appear to have
approved of the idea that statements to the physician were admissible
as an exception to confrontation." 2 Given these concurrences, it
appears likely that the Court may recognize that statements under the
medical exception are nontestimonial.
G. Medical Records Qualify For the Business Records Exception
In Crawford Justice Scalia cited business records as an example of
statements that are an exception to confrontation because they are
nontestimonial.273 Based both on Crawford's reference to the business
records exception and the originalist analysis that exceptions that
existed in 1791 are exceptions to confrontation today, medical records
should be considered to be nontestimonial and admissible." 4

269. 502 U.S. 346 (1992).
270. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 58 n.8
271. The Court in Crawford described White as being a case "which involved, inter alia,
statements of a child victim to an investigating police officer admitted as spontaneous
declarations." Id.
272. See White, 502 U.S. at 364-65 (Thomas & Scalia, JJ., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment). The concurring opinion focuses on the statements to the
police officer as possibly falling in the category of testimonial and makes no direct reference
to the medical exception. See id.
273. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 56.
274. See, e.g., Smith v. State, 898 So. 2d 907, 916 (Ala. Crim. App. 2004) (indicating
that autopsy report admissible as business record); Rollins v. State, 866 A.2d. 926, 945
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2005) (stating that autopsy report is a business record and thus
nontestimonial); Commonwealth v. Verde, 827 N.E.2d 701, 705-06 (Mass. 2005) (holding
that admission of drug certificates does not implicate confrontation rights); Commonwealth
v. Lampron, 839 N.E.2d. 870, 874-75 (Mass. App. Ct. 2005) (stating that admission of
medical records permissible under Crawford); Eslora v. State, No. 04-04-00112-CR, 2005
Tex. App. LEXIS 2564, at *10-*12 (Tex. Crim. App. April 6, 2004) (indicating that medical
records are business records and nontestimonial).
The business records exception-i.e., the "shopkeeper's exception'-goes back to 1791.
See PILLIPPS, supra note 38, at 194-99, 194 n.(a), 198 n.(a) ("Shop-books are admitted in
many of the states as evidence of goods sold and delivered, or of work and labor."); see also
Riche v. Broadfield, 1 Dall. 16, 16-17 (Pa. 1768) (holding that strict evidence laws should
not be extended to "mercantile transactions").
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CONCLUSION

A review of confrontation exceptions and common law evidence cases
shows that the right of confrontation in 1791 was much more complicated than many commentators and the Crawford and Davis opinions
acknowledge.
Confrontation and cross-examination was normally
required, but exceptions existed. The oath was normally required, but
again, there were exceptions. The Confrontation Clause did not apply
to the states where most criminal cases were prosecuted in 1791, so little
case law interpreting the Sixth Amendment existed. At least five of the
thirteen new states did not even have confrontation clauses in their state
2 75
constitutions or declarations of rights at the time of the Revolution.
Evidently, lawmakers in those states were willing to leave the right of
confrontation up to what Crawford refers to as the common law
"vagaries of the rules of evidence."276
In Crawford Justice Scalia stated that whether an out-of-court
statement should be admissible without violating confrontation should
be determined based on an originalist analysis. The determination of
whether a statement is testimonial should be made in light of the
Founders' intent and the purpose of the Confrontation Clause. Any
definition of "testimonial" used today should require that the statements
be taken by law enforcement or agents of law enforcement. Otherwise,
any rule to determine whether statements are testimonial will be so
vague as to be unworkable and impractical. The significant number of
exceptions for testimonial out-of-court statements at the time of the
Founders indicates that Crawford's historical analysis is seriously
flawed. The Court's analysis in Davis is also flawed. Under an
originalist analysis, the entire 911 call in Davis should have been
admissible as a spontaneous declaration, res gestae, or hue and cry,
because these exceptions existed in 1791.
Many 911 calls also qualify as statements under the medical exception
because the caller is requesting medical help or treatment. The medical
exception existed at the time of the Founders. It evolved from the
present sense impression exception and present mental state exception.
By 1791 physicians were allowed to testify about a patient's out-of-court
statements if the patient's statements were relied on by the physician in
forming his or her opinion. Physicians were also able to testify about
275. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36,48-49 (2004) (Crawfordcites eight of the
thirteen states as guaranteeing the right of confrontation).
276. Id. at 61 ("Where testimonial statements are involved, we do not think the
Framers meant to leave the Sixth Amendment's protection to the vagaries of the rules of
evidence, much less to amorphous notions of 'reliability.'").

2007]

CRAWFORD V. WASHINGTON

635

the out-of-court patient statements even when the patient statements
were not made under oath. The medical exception allowed for the
admissibility of patient out-of-court statements without confrontation
and cross-examination. The wide use of the medical exception at the
time of the Founders indicates that the Founders would not have
considered statements under the medical exception to be testimonial.
Accordingly, under an originalist analysis, medical exception statements
should be admissible today without confrontation and cross-examination.
A physician's ethical obligation to the patient prevents a physician
from acting as an agent of law enforcement. Because non-physician
medical professionals act as agents of physicians, statements made to
them also qualify for the medical exception. The medical exception
applies to patient statements even when the patient has received no
treatment because the physician does make some kind of diagnosis.
Furthermore, physicians are not manufacturing evidence when recording
a patient's statements but simply using another form of memorialization.
Statements under the medical exception also qualify for the business
records exception. Because the Court has already stated that business
records are not testimonial, medical records should also qualify as an
exception to confrontation.
As Chief Justice Rehnquist's concurring opinion in Crawford accurately points out, at the time of the ratification of the Sixth Amendment,
hearsay law was still evolving.277 The Founders' understanding of the
right of confrontation and its exceptions was also evolving. What was
not evolving was the Founders' commitment to justice. The Preamble of
the Constitution states that one of the Founders' goals was to "establish
Justice."278 Justice results when the guilty are held accountable, while
at the same time protecting the constitutional rights of all, including the
innocent. The two goals should not be considered mutually exclusive. 279

277. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 71 n.1 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
278. The Founders also wanted to ensure domestic tranquility and promote the general
welfare, also a goal of the criminal justice system:
We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union,
establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence,
promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and
our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution of the United States of
America.
U.S. CONST. pmbl.

279. Professor Susan Estrich has perhaps stated it best:
Society obviously has an interest in not tolerating the techniques of a police state,
but it also has an interest in ensuring that the state is capable of imposing
responsibility for wrongs. It is better that ten guilty men go free than one
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The existence of a significant number of confrontation exceptions in
1791, which Crawford either implicitly or explicitly acknowledges as
being testimonial, and the other exceptions that can be discerned if one
carefully interprets the historical evidence, show that the Founders'
generation believed confrontation exceptions were required in order to
achieve justice."' Although Crawford does not address the issue,
exceptions for dying declarations, forfeiture by wrongdoing, spontaneous
declarations or res gestae, the Marian statute exceptions-including
statements before justices of the peace and statements at a coroner's
inquest-the coconspirator exception, statements in travail, the medical
exception, and others were clearly used during the Founders' era to
ensure the attainment of "'the twofold aim (of criminal justice) ... that
guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer.'"2" 1 If we are to achieve
justice for child abuse victims and for society, we should acknowledge
that statements under the medical exception should continue to exist as
an exception to the confrontation right today.

innocent man be punished; but it is best of all if the ten guilty are punished while
the innocent man goes free.
SUSAN ESTRICH, GETTING AWAY WITH MURDER 96-97 (1998). If the Founders intended that
confrontation be considered an absolute right, that out-of-court statements cannot be
introduced no matter what the reason, they Would not have allowed the use of dying
declarations, spontaneous declarations, forfeiture by wrongdoing, statements in travail, the
medical exception, and the use of other exceptions that existed in 1791. Nor would they
have allowed admissibility without confrontation for statements that were introduced for
reasons other than to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement. Because the
Founders did allow statements to be admitted when these confrontation exceptions applied,
the Founders did not consider confrontation to be an absolute right without exceptions,
even when the statements were testimonial.
280. The Marian statutes were probably passed by Parliament because of Parliament's
concerns about the inability to prosecute felony cases when the victim was unavailable
because the victim had been threatened or murdered. See generally LANGBEIN, ORIGINS,
supra note 21, at 55.
281. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709 (1974) (quoting Berger v. United States,
295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935)) (first alteration in original).

